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Letter from the Secretary of War, to the Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs, communicating information in relation to the escape of the Cheyenne Indians from Fort Robinson

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LETTER

FROM

THE SECRETARY OF WAR,

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS,

COMMUNICATING

*Information in relation to the escape of the Cheyenne Indians from Fort
Robinson.*

FEBRUARY 12, 1879.—Ordered to be printed.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 29, 1879.

SIR: In reply to your letter of the 17th instant, inclosing Senate resolution of the 15th instant, inquiring "into the circumstances which led to the recent escape of the Cheyenne Indians from Fort Robinson and their subsequent slaughter by the United States forces who were charged with their custody," I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of reports and such correspondence on the subject as are of record in this department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

Hon. W. B. ALLISON,
*Chairman Committee on Indian Affairs,
United States Senate.*

COPY OF CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
LED TO THE RECENT ESCAPE OF CHEYENNES FROM FORT ROBINSON,
NEBRASKA, ETC.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, January 29, 1879.

Official copy.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

[Telegram.]

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, January 18, 1879.

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Division Missouri, Chicago, Illinois:

The General desires you to cause an immediate authentic report of the arrest and confinement of the Cheyennes at Fort Robinson, the circum-

stances which led to their recent escape, and the subsequent action of the military authorities based thereon.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., January 22, 1879.

SIR: In compliance with telegraphic instructions from the General of the Army, of the 18th instant, I have the honor to forward herewith a brief of dispatches which have been received at and sent from these headquarters, in order of date, which furnish a concise history of the circumstances attending the capture, confinement, and escape of the Cheyenne prisoners.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C.

BRIEFS.

General Crook telegraphs, October 25, 1878, that Lieutenant Johnson, at Camp (Fort) Robinson, Nebr., reports information received from Capt. J. B. Johnson, Third Cavalry, that he had captured 60 of the hostile Cheyennes on the Niobrara River, and that he was in pursuit of another party of them. (See paper marked 7557, A. G. O. 1778, accompanying.)

General Crook repeats, October 25, 1878, telegram from Capt. J. B. Johnson, dated camp at Shadron Creek, Nebraska, October 24, reporting his arrival there the night before, in a violent snow-storm, with 150 Cheyenne prisoners and 140 head of stock; that he had disarmed and dismounted the Indians and sent the stock to Camp Robinson. (See paper marked 7557, A. G. O. 1878, accompanying.)

In telegram to General Crook, October 26, 1878, acknowledging receipt of foregoing telegrams, Lieutenant-General Sheridan says the balance of the Cheyennes must be in the hills, and that there cannot be many more. He expresses same opinion in telegram to Adjutant-General of the Army, October 26.

General Crook telegraphs, October 26, 1878, that Maj. C. H. Carlton, Third Cavalry, reports he learns from the Indians captured that they were not aware of the removal of the Sioux agencies from Camps Robinson and Sheridan, and that they intended to go to the latter agency; and that he intends to look for the trail of those still out under Little Wolf. (See paper marked 7632, A. G. O. 1878.)

General Crook telegraphs, October 28, 1878, that Maj. C. H. Carlton reports the Cheyenne prisoners are now confined in a set of quarters at Camp Robinson; that they gave considerable trouble before arriving, saying they would rather die than return to the Indian Territory. General Crook asks what disposition shall be made of them. (See paper marked 7937, A. G. O. 1878.)

In repeating this telegram to the Adjutant-General of the Army, October 29, Lieutenant-General Sheridan expresses his belief that these Indians were encouraged to come north, and that the whole reservation system will be endangered unless all these Indians are taken back and compelled to stay, except the ringleaders, whom he recommends be sent to Florida.

General Crook, October 31, 1878, telegraphs dispatch from Maj. C. H. Carlton, at Camp Robinson, Nebr., reporting disposition made of troops to capture Cheyennes still out, and stating that if prisoners are to go south, it will be necessary to tie and haul them, and recommending they be not informed at present or they will give trouble, as he has but few men to spare to guard them. (These dispatches not received at War Department.)

In acknowledging receipt of this telegram, Lieutenant-General Sheridan says it would be well to send more men to Camp Robinson to guard prisoners; that the post is more important than Fort Laramie and other posts in the department, and should have a fair sized garrison this winter. General Crook replies, November 1, 1878, that this matter has been attended to.

General Crook forwards, November 1, 1878, telegram from Maj. C. H. Carlton, stating that Red Cloud requests that the knives of the prisoners be taken from them, as they will kill themselves, if necessary, to prevent returning south; also that those who committed outrages have escaped north; that those captured had avoided committing outrages; and Major Carlton believes that Red Cloud's opinion is correct. (See paper marked 7792, A. G. O. 1878.)

Lieutenant-General Sheridan, in forwarding this to the Adjutant-General of the Army, November 5, 1878, says it looks as if there was an unnecessary amount of sympathy in the Department of the Platte for these Indians, and suspects they were encouraged to come north. He sympathizes with Indians, but says that to encourage them to oppose the policy of the government is doubtful propriety; that unless these Indians are sent back, the reservation system will receive a shock which will endanger its stability. If Indians can leave without punishment, they will not stay on the reservations. (Not received at War Department.)

Lieutenant-General Sheridan telegraphs, November 8, 1878, the Adjutant-General of the Army, urging that some disposition be made of the Cheyenne prisoners now at Camp Robinson, they being a source of great inconvenience and expense, situated as at present. (See paper marked 7836, A. G. O. 1878.)

Lieutenant-General Sheridan, November 13, 1878, telegraphs General Sherman that the hostile Cheyennes captured had to be kept at Camp Robinson in order to have a secure place for them and a sufficient force to guard them, and advises that the decision of the government in their case be kept from them until all arrangements are completed for carrying it out. (See paper marked 7926, A. G. O. 1878.)

Commanding general Department of Dakota forwards, November 5, 1878, report of Capt. P. Vroom, Third Cavalry, of scout by his command to intercept hostile Cheyennes. (See paper marked 7966, A. G. O. 1878.)

General Crook forwards, November 6, 1878, official reports of Maj. C. H. Carlton and Capt. J. B. Johnson, giving details of the capture of the Cheyennes. Major Carlton states that when, after their capture, he ordered the Indians to get ready to move to Camp Robinson, they decided, after several hours' talk, they would rather die where they were than return to the Indian Territory. Seeming to think going to Camp Robinson was a step in that direction, they began to dig rifle-pits and constructed breast-works opposite each detachment of troops by whom they were surrounded. During the night two pieces of artillery arrived, seeing which the Indians consented to move, and were taken to Camp Robinson. (See paper marked 7937, A. G. O. 1878.)

The governor of Kansas, in letter November 11, 1878, states that these Cheyenne Indians, on their passage through Kansas, committed crimes revolting in their nature, more than forty men were murdered and many women ravished and worse than murdered. States that an Indian invasion so revolting in its fiendish details demands the adoption of extreme measures to prevent a recurrence, and calls upon the Secretary of War for the surrender to the civil authorities of Kansas, for trial, the principal chiefs, Dull-Knife, Old Crow, Hog, Little Wolf, and others whose identity can be established in the crimes of murder and woman ravishing. Requests that additional troops be stationed at Forts Sill and Reno to protect settlers. (See papers marked 8101, A. G. O., 1878.)

In letter November 19, 1878, forwarding above, Lieutenant-General Sheridan says the question is, can we send more troops to the points designated. As the troops in this division are holding places where the danger is the same as in Kansas, suggests that Eighteenth Infantry be ordered to Department of the Missouri, and that if the six companies Fourth Cavalry in Texas can be spared, that they be sent to Fort Wallace, Kans. Should any of the Cheyennes at Fort Reno, Ind. T., strike north a panic would take place. We have not half enough soldiers, and it is embarrassing to give orders to an inadequate force to engage an enemy where annihilation is the result of defeat, to say nothing of the responsibility to which the military is held for the murder of defenseless settlers. (See papers marked 8101, A. G. O., 1878.)

General Pope reports November 19, 1878, that to provide against contingencies until cavalry is sent to Department of the Missouri, he has mounted about forty infantry at each of the posts Forts Wallace and Dodge, Kans., and asks approval, which was given in letter of November 23, 1878. (Not received at War Department.)

General Crook forwards copy, December 12, 1878, of telegram from Maj. C. H. Carlton, commanding troops near Camp Robinson, stating that after diligent and thorough search the Cheyennes still out have not been discovered. General Crook thinks that as long as Major Carlton's command is out the Indians will manage to elude it. Will withdraw this command and it may then be possible for the garrison at Camp Robinson to arrest them. (Not received at War Department.)

General Sherman refers December 5, 1878, copy of letter from Secretary Interior November 22, stating that Commissioner Indian Affairs recommends that the Cheyenne prisoners be taken to Fort Wallace or other post in Kansas, with a view to identification of such as committed outrages and for trial by civil authorities, and that the remainder be sent to their agency in Indian Territory. General Sherman says if the

captives march towards their reservation Fort Wallace will be a good place for the purpose, but if they are sent by rail Fort Leavenworth is a better place. (See papers marked 8207 and 8751, A. G. O., 1878.)

Copy of this communication was sent December 16, confidentially, to General Crook, with directions to send the prisoners under guard, by rail, to Fort Leavenworth. Copy was also sent to General Pope, with directions that upon arrival of the prisoners at Fort Leavenworth, a number of them be retained for identification, and the rest returned to Cheyenne agent at Fort Reno, Ind. T. The governor of Kansas and Adjutant-General of the Army were notified of these instructions.

General Crook telegraphs December 20, 1878, that the Cheyenne prisoners are much in need of clothing, and asks, "Cannot clothing be issued them by Indian Bureau from annuity goods on hand at Red Cloud or Spotted Tail Agencies, to be charged to the appropriation for support of Cheyennes in Indian Territory." (See paper marked 8705, A. G. O., 1878.)

General Pope requests information December 23, 1878, as to when Cheyennes would arrive at Leavenworth, as he wished to communicate with the governor of Kansas in order to have persons present who could identify them. (Not received at War Department.)

Lieutenant-General Sheridan telegraphs General Crook December 23, 1878, for this information.

General Crook acknowledges by telegram, December 24, 1878, receipt of instructions sent him on December 16 relative to disposition of prisoners, and says it would be inhuman to move them as ordered, the mercury having been for several days below zero at Camp Robinson. It will take some time to get transportation there for their removal; and the men will have to be handcuffed. Invites attention to his former telegram about clothing for them. (Not received at War Department.)

Lieutenant-General Sheridan in reply telegraphs General Crook December 24, 1878, that he desired the Cheyennes moved as soon as it was right and proper to do so, and that such measures as were necessary to accomplish this be adopted. The subject of supplying clothing had been again referred to Washington.

January 6, 1879, General Crook repeated telegram received from commanding officer Camp (Fort) Robinson, asking if he should issue clothing to the prisoners—49 men, 51 women, and 48 children. The Indians say they will die before returning to the Indian Territory, and he has no recourse but to take their food and fuel away. Dull Knife is inclined to give up, but the young men won't let him. He offered to feed the children, but the Indians would not allow it. General Crook says it is hard to ask the military to perform this disagreeable duty. Asks if the Indian Department cannot send some one to superintend the movement, the military simply to furnish the escort. (See paper marked 53, A. G. O., 1879.)

The Lieutenant-General, in repeating this telegram to the Adjutant-General of the Army on January 7, said the weather has been so extremely cold since the order was given for their removal that no action could be taken, especially as they are without clothing, and no reply has been received to appeal made for it on December 20. To General Crook, on the same day, the Lieutenant-General telegraphed, saying he had forwarded his telegram of the 6th to Washington, and cannot see how the Indians can be moved without warm clothing during this cold period.

General Crook, January 7, 1879, repeats telegram from commanding officer Fort Robinson, stating that the Indians refuse to move; but, if not interfered with, he will get them away; has been holding a large escort to take them to the railroad, and thinks they should move as quickly as possible; that Commissioner Hayt is telegraphing about clothing for the Indians. General Crook asks authority to issue clothing from the Quartermaster's Department, if the Indian Bureau cannot furnish it. (See paper marked 64, A. G. O., 1879.)

Adjutant-General of the Army telegraphs, January 10, 1879, that the Indian Office had been authorized by the Secretary of the Interior to purchase in open market for the Cheyenne prisoners such clothing as might be needed for them, to an amount not exceeding \$500. (See paper marked 100, A. G. O., 1879.)

Adjutant-General of the Army, January 7, 1879, refers to Lieutenant-General Sheridan with directions to hold the prisoners for further orders. Copy of letter from Interior Department, recommending that the remainder of the Cheyenne prisoners, not included in the list to be turned over to the civil authorities, be held at Fort Wallace in order to consider the propriety of selecting others to be sent to Saint Augustine. (See paper marked 8969, A. G. O., 1878.)

This was referred to the commanding general Department of the Missouri, January 10, for proper action when the Cheyenne prisoners reach Fort Leavenworth.

January 10, General Crook forwarded telegram from Captain Wessells, commanding Camp (Fort) Robinson, stating that the Cheyennes, at 10 p. m. (9th), broke out from their building; 35 were recaptured, about 30 killed, and 18 surrendered, making 53 in our hands, including Hog, Crow, and Left-Hand, three headmen; will have many more before dark. Five companies are out in pursuit. (See paper marked 114, A. G. O., 1879.)

General Crook repeats telegram received from commanding officer Camp (Fort) Robinson, January 11, stating that Indians commenced outbreak by firing upon the guard, killing one and wounding four; they continued firing during their flight, evidently having arms and ammunition. So far, 3 soldiers have been killed and 7 wounded; also, that Captain Wessells left early that morning (11th) in pursuit. (Not received at War Department.)

January 12, the Lieutenant-General telegraphed General Crook, asking if he could get any fuller information of affairs at Fort Robinson. To this General Crook replied that he has not been able to obtain a detailed report, so he sent Lieutenant Schuyler, of his staff, to Robinson to investigate and report. (Not received at War Department.)

January 12, General Crook repeats telegram received from commanding officer Fort Robinson (Captain Wessells) stating that the Indians were as well armed and supplied with as much ammunition as any Indians that ever went on the war-path. They had pistols and carbines in abundance, and used them to great advantage. He fought them all day on the 11th, 12 miles from the post and left them entrenched after dark. Will forward a written report of the whole affair on the 13th. Says great care was taken not to hurt women or children from the commencement to the end of the affair, and that officers and men were as humane and tender with children and squaws as any people could be. (See paper marked 156, A. G. O., 1879.)

In telegram to General Crook, of January 13, the Lieutenant-General says Captain Wessells should not allow the Cheyennes to escape, but in doing this his operations should be governed by the highest regard for humanity. If they have carbines, they must have been secreted for them in the cañon where they first made a stand. (See paper marked 156, A. G. O., 1879.)

To the adjutant-general of the Army on the same day, the Lieutenant-General telegraphed the substance of the foregoing dispatch from Captain Wessells.

January 13, General Crook repeats telegram from Captain Wessells of that date, stating that Lieutenant Simpson struck the Indians that morning and had a corporal killed, and later, near Hat Creek road, another man wounded; that he sent Vroom out at once, and at 4 a. m. to-morrow (14th) starts himself with two companies; also, that his command has been skirmishing with the Indians since 10 o'clock on the night of the 9th, and have had 4 killed and 8 wounded. (Not received at War Department.)

In acknowledging receipt of this telegram on the 14th, the Lieutenant-General says it is to be hoped the Cheyennes will be recaptured, and asks General Crook to give such orders as will accomplish it.

January 14, General Crook repeats telegram from Captain Wessells at Fort Robinson of that date, stating that the day before they fired 40 rounds of shell and solid shot into the rifle-pits of the Indians, who were entrenched 20 miles away from the post, on the Hat Creek road, without injuring any of them, and in the night the Indians got away; that his command is worn out, but he will try them again with two other companies. (See papers marked 289, A. G. O., 1879.)

January 15, General Crook telegraphs that he has ordered the commanding officers of Forts Robinson and Laramie to take up the Cheyenne trail and follow it until the Indians are recaptured; and that he expects to hear from Lieutenant Schuyler that day. (Not received at War Department.)

In acknowledging receipt of this telegram, on the 15th the Lieutenant-General says the pursuit so far after these Cheyennes is not creditable, and that it seems strange how fifteen or twenty savages, with twenty-five or thirty squaws and children, could get away from five companies of cavalry or even two companies of cavalry.

January 15, General Crook repeats telegram from Lieutenant Schuyler at Fort Robinson of that date, stating that after full investigation of affairs there he finds that on the 3d instant the headmen were notified that they must go back south; that after consultation, "Hog" as spokesman, the next day, said they would rather die than go back, and the attempt to starve and freeze them out was now the only alternative. On the 9th instant it was decided to arrest "Hog" as the leading oppositionist, and he was ironed, but not before a struggle in which a soldier was stabbed; the Indians in the prison immediately barricaded the doors, tore up the floors, and constructed rifle pits to command all the windows. From this time the prison was like a den of rattle snakes, but it was supposed the Indians had no arms other than a few knives. At ten minutes before ten o'clock (on the 9th) four shots were fired from the west end of the prison, killing two of the sentinels, and shots were also fired from a front window into the guard-room, wounding a corporal. Simultaneously a rush was made through all the windows, the Indians sallying out resolved to kill and be killed like Malays running amuck. The guard and other troops gave chase, the Indians moved south toward the creek, the squaws were driven in a body ahead of the men, at least five of the latter keeping up an incessant fire; it was in returning this fire that several women and children were killed. No woman or child was intentionally harmed, and many officers and soldiers showed great daring in trying to save them. No Indians were killed who could have been captured. That when the Indians were first cap-

tured they were but partially disarmed, and several guns and pistols were taken from them after they entered the prison, so they had ample time to secrete arms under the floor. The prison has been so guarded that arms could not have been introduced, but events proved that they had 15 guns in addition to the 2 obtained from the dead sentinels, and some few revolvers; that the squaws say the men feared hanging if they returned south, and in this affair all expected to die. The casualties up to date are 5 soldiers killed and 7 wounded, 32 Indians killed and 71 captured. (See paper marked 344, A. G. O., 1879.)

January 16, General Crook repeats telegram from Lieutenant Schuyler, at Fort Robinson, stating that of the escaped Cheyennes there are fully 45 not accounted for by death or capture of these 19 are men; that Captain Wessells started out with a company that morning, leaving Captain Vroom in command of the post. (See paper marked 297, A. G. O., 1879.)

January 16, General Crook repeats telegram from Lieutenant Schuyler, stating that he interviewed Hog, Crow, and Left Hand, who say that all the young men, including some 15 of their party, who were lately in prison at Fort Robinson, were actively engaged in the Kansas outrages; that Hog and Crow repeated emphatically that the Cheyennes would never have been gotten out of their prison alive after they knew that they had to go South; that cutting down their rations only made them more desperate, and that the arms must have been concealed in their clothing when first confined; also, that if any of the fugitives escape the troops they will probably join Little Wolf, whom they believe to be in the vicinity of the Powder. (See paper marked 296, A. G. O., 1879.)

January 18, General Crook telegraphs that the Cheyennes were found 12 miles distant from where they were last seen. Says a band of horses were taken from a ranch on the Sidney road, it was supposed by some of Little Wolf's band; that he has ordered troops from Fort Russell after them. (See paper marked 318, A. G. O., 1879.)

Agent from Pine Ridge reports the Sioux much excited over the Cheyenne troubles.

January 18, General Crook telegraphs that Agent Irwin, now at Robinson, says that he telegraphed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to have women and children of Sioux blood now in confinement there turned over to the Red Cloud Indians, who demand it in positive terms; that Irwin regards this as a measure of great importance, and his own belief is that if request is granted it will do good. (Not received at War Department.)

January 19, the General of the Army telegraphs that the Secretary of War wishes the commanding officer of Camp (Fort) Robinson instructed, in case he uses any Red Cloud's scouts, to do so with the view of securing the surrender of the escaped Cheyennes rather than for the purpose of fighting them. (See paper marked 331, A. G. O., 1879.)

Repeated to General Crook same day. In acknowledging receipt of this telegram, the Lieutenant-General says he has no official information of any intention to use Red Cloud's scouts, and that he feels somewhat disgusted at the manner in which the whole business at Fort Robinson has been conducted.

FORT ROBINSON, NEBR., *January 12, 1879.*

SIR: I have the honor to state that I arrived at this post December 4, 1878. Lieutenant Johnson, Fourteenth Infantry, was in command of post, but Captain Johnson, Third Cavalry, the senior officer, present. Colonel Carleton was absent after Little Wolf. Captain Johnson, with his company, were guarding the Cheyenne prisoners, and I told him to continue doing so, and added the band to his command. With the other companies I guarded the post and performed the usual garrison duty.

When Captain Johnson left, I put the Indians under a guard detailed daily from all companies of the command, and put a corporal and two men of my company to cook for the Indians, and instructed the officer of the day to visit them frequently, and did the same myself.

On taking charge I found these Cheyennes prisoners of war, and thought, of course, that as they had been in Colonel Carleton's possession for over a month, they were thoroughly disarmed; in fact, I was informed that they had been searched twice, and all arms found taken away. Still, I knew they had knives, for I saw them daily, and thought it possible there might be two or three pistols among them. After Colonel Carleton went away I discouraged the Sioux visiting this post, and none had been, here for a long while previous to the outbreak. When Sioux visited the building, when in charge of B Company, there were always two sentinels in the room, besides non-commissioned officers of the guard and officers constantly passing through the rooms. Everything went on nicely, the Indians were good-natured, and said they were well treated, but told myself and other officers repeatedly that they never would go South. I, however, never said much to them on that subject, for the reason that I did not know anything about it myself.

When I received orders to move them to Sidney I well knew that I had a most difficult and responsible task before me, but felt perfect confidence in myself, and resolved to do the best I knew how. My principal object from the start was to avoid bloodshed and exciting the Indians, and in all my conversation I was calm but decided.

When everything was ready on the a. m. of the 3d, I called Hog, Crow, Dull Knife, Tangle Hair, and Left Hand into my office and told them that the Great Father had decided that they should be sent back to the Indian Territory; that they would probably take the cars from Sidney; everything would be done for their comfort, and they would receive plenty of food and clothing. Dull Knife got up first and said that this was the home of the Northern Cheyenne; their fathers buried and their children raised here. They left their agency to come to this place, and here they wanted to remain; that they did not get enough to eat at their agency, and that since going South with Lieutenant Lawton, Fourth Cavalry, fifty-eight of their people had died; even the children did not wish to return. Hog repeated what Dull Knife had said. I answered that I had nothing to do in the premises, that I was simply obeying orders; their going could not be avoided, and that I hoped they would go quietly and without trouble. Captain Vroom, who was present at the talk, told them he was going as far as Sidney with them, and would see they were well cared for. They then went back to their quarters to communicate the news. I went through the building during that day and the next, but avoided conversing with them. I increased the guard, and took the sentinel that was inside and put him on the outside. On the afternoon of the 4th I called Hog in the office and asked him what they were going to do. Hog said that they would do anything that I wanted them to do but go South, and that they would not do. I told Hog that I would have no more to say, but would act.

That night they had supper, but ordered that it should be their last meal, and should receive no more fuel. They understood that as soon as they would give up they could have fuel and food. However, at no time did they suffer for either. I gave instructions to the officer of the day to keep a good lookout, and have his sentinels vigilant, and not under any circumstances to kill Indians till it was absolutely necessary, either to save their own lives or prevent escape.

On the night of the 8th, I made up my mind to get Hog in irons, as I knew he was the leading spirit, and the one by whom they were in great measure guided. By getting him separated from the rest, they would be without his counsel. I said nothing to any one till the next morning, when I told Lieutenant Baxter, Third Cavalry, what I was going to do. I told him to go to H Company quarters, and be ready for any emergency. I then instructed four trusty men to be in the clerk's room, and come into my office when Hog entered, and what to do when I gave the signal. Hog would not come, but wanted me to go in their quarters, where all might hear what I had to say. I told him he might bring Crow, and they came. In the mean time I sent for two more men to the guard-house. When Hog and Crow entered, I asked them if they would go South, and continued talking, while the room was filling with soldiers. Lieutenant Cummings being already present, I gave the signal, when we all jumped on the two Indians at the same time.

Lieutenant Cummings, Sergeant Dunne, Company H, Third Cavalry, a man of Company E, Third Cavalry, and myself took Hog. Crow gave up at once, but we had to struggle very hard to get Hog handcuffed. Before we did so, he stabbed Private Ferguson, Company E, Third Cavalry, slightly with a knife; he had three on his person. After he was handcuffed he called me to him, and said they would go South, and that if I would take off the irons and let him go back to the people he would get their consent to the move.

While we were waiting for an ambulance to convey them to Captain Vroom's camp, I sent word to the Indians that the relatives of the two Indians could come out and go with them. Hog's wife came out; but when she went back to the building to get her effects they would not let her come out. Hog, before getting into the ambulance, said he wished I would stay with them to see they were not hurt on the road. The Indians made two attempts, in the course of the afternoon, to get out the doors, but were driven back by the sentries. At no time were any fire-arms shown by the Indians.

During the afternoon the excitement died out, and towards night Hog was allowed to come up and talk with the Indians. He got his and Crow's relatives out, and they went back to the lower camp. At seven at night I was around the building, and found the sentinels alert and everything quiet inside. Lieutenant Simpson, the officer of the day, just about 9.30 o'clock p. m., went to the adjutant's office, which is about twenty-five yards from the Indian quarters, intending to stay about an hour or so. At 10 o'clock the Indians commenced firing through windows and doors, killing one sentry and wounding two and the corporal of the guard, and immediately followed the shots. I had just gotten into bed. I got up, put on my pants, a pair of arctics and no stockings, my overcoat and hat, and ran down to the east end of the Indians' building. The Indians were all out, running away. I got Company C, Third Cavalry, to follow. The Indians fired at us repeatedly with carbines, and we killed five bucks in a few moments. Captain Vroom, when the firing commenced, saddled his company, sent A

Company up to the post dismounted, and E Company dismounted, to cover the Sheridan road. I followed with C Company and men of H Company, who joined a few at a time.

I passed two wounded squaws, both of whom I had carefully carried back to the post. I carried a two-year old child back on the road till I met an H Company man, whom I told to take the baby to a comfortable place. I then returned and told H Company men to saddle, dress themselves warmly, and assemble at the stables.

On mounting, I went on a gallop to where Captain Vroom was fighting the Indians in the bluffs, about four miles out on the Laramie road, accompanied by Lieutenant Crawford. On my arrival I found Lieutenant Chase and part of A Company there also; they had killed about eight Indians at that spot. I sent Captain Vroom around on the Hat Creek road and Lieutenant Chase back with the wounded squaws, and told him to go afterwards on the Deadwood road to prevent the Indians crossing toward Pine Ridge Agency. I sent orders to E Company to go down White River. Lieutenant Crawford was to gather up stragglers and come back to the bluffs, and in the morning look for Indians. I sent most of my men, under the first sergeant, across to right bank of White River, and went on top of bluffs north of river myself, with six men. We struck fresh moccasin tracks on top of them, and soon overtook and killed two Indians; a third one got away. One of the Indians had twenty-five Sharps' carbine cartridges with brass shells and a Remington pistol. The man who held our horses let them go, and we had to walk about six miles towards the post before we got them again. We then rode in and went to bed.

This report will be continued as soon as possible. I have to prepare for another scout.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. WESSELLS, JR.,

Captain Third Cavalry, Commanding Post.

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

Headquarters Department Platte, Fort Omaha, Nebr.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Fort Omaha, Nebr., January 16, 1879.

Official copy respectfully furnished the assistant adjutant-general, Military Division of the Missouri, for the information of the Lieutenant-General commanding.

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

482, A. G. O., 1879.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Fort Omaha, Nebr., January 22, 1879.

SIR: In obedience to telegraphic instructions from headquarters Military Division Missouri, I have the honor to report, that when in September last I received notification of the outbreak of the Cheyennes from their reservation in Indian Territory, the available force in this department was so attenuated that it was with great difficulty that I was enabled to assemble on the Union Pacific Railroad at Sidney a small number of troops, nearly all infantry, drawn from the various posts in the department between Salt Lake and Omaha.

This hastily-organized battalion was mounted on cavalry horses from Fort McPherson. It was impossible, owing to the lack of time, to properly supply this command with transportation or to furnish it with Indian guides. The operations of the battalion in question in the pursuit of the hostile Cheyennes were fully described in the reports of Major Thornburg, Fourth Infantry, the commanding officer, and of First Lieut. John G. Bourke, Third Cavalry, *aïd-de-camp*, who accompanied it. These reports were duly forwarded to your headquarters.

The Fifth Cavalry, under General Merritt, and the Third Cavalry, under Colonel Carlton, both of which regiments had been in the field since early in May, were ordered to move as rapidly as possible, the former to Fort Laramie and the latter to Camp Robinson. These commands had with them Indian guides and pack-trains, and were in condition to make prolonged scouts. Major Tilford's command had, by this time, reached Camp Sheridan from the Department of Dakota, and took part in the pursuit. On the 23d of October Captain Johnson, Third Cavalry, with two companies of that regiment, came upon Dull Knife's band of the Cheyennes, 149 in number, and after a parley, they surrendered and were brought in to Colonel Carlton's main camp on Chadron Creek. Colonel Carlton's report is so terse and lucid that I quote it in full:

"HEADQUARTERS BATTALION THIRD CAVALRY,

Camp near Camp Robinson, Nebr., October 29, 1878.

"SIR: I have the honor to state that on the evening of the 25th October, Dull Knife's band Cheyenne Indians were camped in a thicket under a guard from this

command. As they had been brought in in a blinding snow-storm, their numbers were variously estimated. Their ponies had been taken away from them and such few arms as could be found under the circumstances. When I directed them to get ready to move to Camp Robinson, they had a talk of several hours, with the decision that they would die where they were in preference to returning to Indian Territory, and seemed to think Camp Robinson a step in that direction.

"As it was a matter of indifference which way we moved I offered to take them to Camp Sheridan, but they declined; evidently did not believe me, and seemed to think they would be killed the moment they left the thicket, and were therefore desperate. As it was then too late to go to either post, had they been willing, I camped the troops directly around the thicket on open ground and in easy range.

"From the moment they heard they were going to Robinson they set to work digging pits, and when the troops camped constructed breastworks opposite each detachment of troops, also indulging in some war-songs. Two companies of Seventh Cavalry were at the time marching from Sheridan towards me.

"Major Tilford hearing of the condition of affairs, very kindly (and without request from me) ordered them to continue their march and report to me. Captain Monahan very kindly sent out a howitzer, obtaining an escort for it from Major Tilford. Lieutenant Chase, Third Cavalry, under orders to join, very thoughtfully (but without orders) brought a brass piece with him. These detachments were arriving during the night and were evidently observed by the Indians, for after their arrival they sent out word they would be ready to go to Sheridan in the morning.

"In the morning they were shown the numbers and position of the troops and informed that they had been allowed a choice as to direction and had declined it; now they must go to Robinson and would have nothing to eat until they arrived there, and must decide at once. They decided to go and arrived here at ten o'clock at night. After arriving here their breech-loaders were taken from them. The few arms taken from them at camp on Chadron were muzzle-loaders or unserviceable. The position of the troops seemed to me a delicate one; an assault would probably have resulted in killing the majority of the men and women. It might have been considered that after the Indians had surrendered and had given up their horses and arms, the troops then murdered them. Lone Bear and Two Lance (Sioux) staid in the Indian camp during the night to see that none escaped. I promised (and gave) Two Lance his daughter (who was married to a Cheyenne) and her two children whenever the Cheyennes were once started on the road to Robinson. I promised to treat them as prisoners of war until they should arrive at Camp Robinson, but persistently urged upon them that I would make no promises as to their future disposition or punishment, and think they understand it.

"Very respectfully,

"C. H. CARLTON,
"Major Third Cavalry, Commanding.

"ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
"DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
"Omaha Barracks."

On the night of October 26 the Cheyennes reached Camp Robinson, and were at once confined in a set of company quarters. They then numbered 146—46 full-grown men, 60 women, and 40 children.

The remainder of the Cheyennes under Little Wolf succeeded in effecting their escape by scattering in the sand-hills, a dense snow covering their tracks and making trailing impossible, although search was kept up until numbers of our soldiers were badly frozen.

On the 26th of October I telegraphed copy of telegram from Major Carlton, Third Cavalry, stating that the Cheyenne prisoners said they had left the Indian Territory because they had been starved, and also that it was the intention of the remainder of the Northern Cheyennes to break out and come north. I also asked to be informed what disposition was intended to be made of these prisoners.

On the 31st of October I received and duly forwarded to your headquarters Major Carlton's telegram that if these prisoners were to be taken south it would "be necessary to tie and haul them," and on 1st November his telegram that Red Cloud, chief of the Ogallalla Sioux, had recommended that the Cheyenne prisoners be deprived even of knives, as they "would kill themselves to keep from going south."

During the month of November Major Carlton was kept in the field in command of the troops engaged in searching for the remnants of the band of Cheyennes under Little Wolf, and the care of the Cheyenne prisoners fell under charge of Captain Westless, Third Cavalry, who reached Camp Robinson on December 4.

On the 30th of December I received your confidential instructions relative to the removal of the Cheyennes to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in accordance with the recommendation of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that they should be sent to such place in Kansas as would enable the civil authorities to identify those who had been engaged in the horrible series of outrages in that State.

10 ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON

At that time the temperature at Camp Robinson was arctic in severity; for a number of days it was reported that the thermometer had not indicated as much as zero. The Cheyennes were in rags, and, as a measure of humanity, clothing was necessary before such a journey as had been ordered could be made. This matter of clothing had already been brought to your attention December 20, and without delay. I received your reply that you had telegraphed the facts in the case to Washington. On the 24th December, I again telegraphed about clothing.

On the 26th, I determined to take the responsibility, as a last resort, of ordering Captain Wessells to issue such military clothing as could be made available. It is easy to understand, however, that this action of mine could be productive of but little benefit, as there were 60 women and 40 children to be provided for, and the Quartermaster's Department is not supplied with clothing suitable for them, and consequently I was not surprised to receive another dispatch from Captain Wessells, dated December 26, asking attention to this matter, and again on January 3, when he informed me that he was ready to move when the clothing should arrive.

Hoping something might soon be done in this matter, I had ordered Captain Wessells, on the 5th January, to make ready for the move, and to provide everything possible for the comfort of the Indians while on the journey. On the 6th of January, I again telegraphed to you on this business, and asking that the Indian Bureau be called upon to send an agent to superintend the movement, the military merely to act as guard, as, under the circumstances, I was not willing to let the responsibility for this movement rest upon the shoulders of the military. January 7, another telegram came from Captain Wessells, and this, like its predecessors, was duly forwarded.

On that same day Captain Wessells again telegraphed saying the Commissioner of Indian Affairs was then telegraphing to Lieutenant Johnson, post quartermaster, about clothing. On the 5th of January, Captain Wessells had telegraphed that the Cheyennes had resolved to die before they would go south, and from the tenor of this dispatch and its comrades I was not unprepared for anything that might occur.

On the 10th I received his brief telegram announcing that on the preceding evening the Cheyennes had fired upon the sentinels, killing 2 and wounding 2, and then had broken out from the company quarters in which they had been confined; also, another dispatch of same date stating that some of the recaptured squaws had told him that the outbreak had been planned and managed by the young men concerned in the Kansas outrages who had become desperate upon learning they were to be sent back to a place where they had good reason to fear they were to be tried.

Captain Wessells being engaged in pursuit of those Cheyennes who had escaped, the reports I received were so meager that I sent Lieutenant Schuyler, of my staff, to Fort Robinson, with instructions to keep me fully informed. Lieutenant Schuyler's dispatches have already been repeated to you.

I have ordered a board of officers to convene at Fort Robinson, for the investigation of this whole affair, and pending the receipt of their report I think it advisable not to express any opinion in the case.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General, Commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Military Division Missouri, Chicago, Ill.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 24, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the General of the Army. By reference to the records of the War Department it will be found that all the telegrams and other communications within referred to by General Crook were duly forwarded to the headquarters of the Army as soon as received at this office. The directions to convey Indians to Fort Leavenworth were forwarded to General Crook by mail, December 21, 1878.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

7557, A. G. O., 1878.

[Copy of telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., October 25, 1878.

General E. D. TOWNSEND, *Washington, D. C. :*

The following dispatch, this moment received, is forwarded for the information of the General of the Army. It goes to show that my impression in this morning's dispatch was correct.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON. 11

General SHERIDAN, *Chicago* :

Lieutenant Johnson at Camp Robinson reports information just received by courier from Capt J. B. Johnson, Third Cavalry, who was sent out by Major Carlton, that he had captured sixty of the hostile Cheyennes, with the chief, Dull Knife, on Niobrara, south of Robinson, and that captives would be brought to Robinson evening of 24th. Captain Johnson states also that he was in pursuit of another smaller party. The details have not been received, as the line between Hat Creek and Robinson fell before the message was finished.

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General.

7557, A. G. O., 1878.

[Copy of telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., October 25, 1878.

General E. D. TOWNSEND, *Washington, D. C.* :

The following just received from General Crook is forwarded for the information of the General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

The following dispatch just received :

"CAMP THIRD CAVALRY BATTALION,
"Chadron Creek, Nebraska, October 24,
"(Via Camp Robinson, Nebraska, 25th).

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Omaha Barracks* :

"Arrived in camp last night in violent snow-storm with one hundred and fifty Cheyenne prisoners and one hundred and forty head of stock, nine of them mules. Dull Knife and Old Crow are with them. My party consisted of Companies B and D, Third Cavalry, the latter commanded by Lieutenant J. C. Thompson. Have dismounted and disarmed the Indians, and sent the stock to Camp Robinson, under guard of Company A, Third Cavalry, Lieutenant Chase commanding.

"JOHNSON,
"Captain Third Cavalry."

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier General.

7632, A. G. O., 1878.

[Copy of telegram.]

OMAHA, NEBR., *October 26, 1878.*

General P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Division, Chicago :

Major Carlton telegraphs from Chadron Creek, October 24th :

"I learn from the Cheyenne Indians, captured by Captain Johnson and Lieutenant Thompson, Third Cavalry, that they were not aware of the removal of the Sioux Agencies from Camp Robinson and Sheridan. This party intended to go into the Camp Sheridan Agency. They separated from a band under Little Wolf's band, intended to go to the Camp Robinson Agency. Cannot ascertain whether Little Wolf's party has gone north or not. If it does not snow too hard to find the trail, I intend to move into Camp Robinson to-morrow, and will work between that post and Fort Laramie. I have suggested to Major Tilford that he work between Camps Sheridan and Robinson."

He further says, the Cheyenne prisoners say they left Indian Territory because they were starved there, and that all the other Cheyennes will come north as soon as they can escape.

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, October 28, 1878.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

7937, A. G. O., 1878.

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION THIRD CAVALRY,
Camp near Camp Robinson, Nebr., October 27, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to state that on the morning of the 25th October Dull Knife's band Cheyenne Indians were camped in the thicket under a guard from this command. As they had been brought in in a blinding snow-storm their numbers were variously estimated. Their ponies had been taken away from them, and such few arms as could be found under the circumstances.

When I directed them to get ready to move to Camp Robinson, they had a talk of several hours, with the decision that they would die where they were in preference to returning to Indian Territory, and seemed to think Camp Robinson a step in that direction.

As it was a matter of indifference which way we moved, I offered to take them to Camp Sheridan, but they declined, evidently did not believe me, and seemed to think they would be killed the moment they left the thicket, and were therefore desperate. As it was then too late to go to either post, had they been willing, I camped the troops directly around the thicket, on open ground and in easy range. From the moment they heard they were going to Robinson they set to work digging pits, and when the troops camped, constructed breastworks opposite each detachment of troops; also indulged in some war songs. Two companies of Seventh Cavalry were at the time marching from Sheridan toward me. Major Tilford, hearing of the condition of affairs, very kindly, and without request from me, ordered them to continue their march and report to me. Captain Monahan very kindly sent out a howitzer, obtaining an escort for it from Major Tilford. Lieutenant Chase, Third Cavalry, under orders to join, very thoughtfully (but without orders) brought a brass piece with him.

These detachments were arriving during the night, and were evidently observed by the Indians, for after their arrival they sent out word that they would be ready to go to Sheridan in the morning. In the morning they were shown the numbers and position of the troops, and informed that they had been allowed a choice as to direction, and declined it. Now they must go to Robinson, and would have nothing to eat until they arrived there, and must decide at once. They decided to go, and arrived here at ten o'clock at night. After arrival here their breech-loaders were taken from them. The few arms taken from them at camp on Chadron were muzzle-loaders or unserviceable.

The position of the troops seemed to me a delicate one. An assault would probably have resulted in killing the majority of men and women. It might have been considered that after the Indians had surrendered and had given up their horses and arms, the troops then murdered them. Lone Bear and Two Lance (Sioux) staid in the Indian camp during the night to see that none escaped.

I promised (and gave) Two Lance his daughter (who was married to a Cheyenne) and her children, whenever the Cheyennes were once started on the road to Robinson. I promised to treat them as prisoners of war until they should arrive at Camp Robinson, but persistently urged upon them that I would make no promise as to their future disposition or punishment, and I think they understood it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. H. CARLTON,
Major Third Cavalry, Commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Department of the Platte, Omaha Barracks, Nebr.

CAMP ON CHADRON CREEK, NEBR.,
October 25, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to Special Orders 59, current series, Headquarters Battalion Third Cavalry, I proceeded on scout after Cheyenne Indians, in command of my company (B) and Company D, Third Cavalry, First Lieut. J. C. Thompson commanding, Mr. Joe. Larabee, interpreter, and two Sioux Indians, Lone Bear and Eagle Pipe, as guides.

October 22, left this camp at 1 o'clock p. m., and marched six miles up the Chadron Creek, and went into camp.

October 23, left camp at 7 o'clock a. m., and proceeded two miles further up Chadron Creek, where the country became very rough, and we then struck across to the south-east towards the Niobrara.

After marching about ten miles, Indians were discovered on a ridge in our front brandishing arms, and some wearing war bonnets.

When preparing for attack, I saw hats and hands waved, and signs made, and the Sioux scouts went to find what it meant. On returning they said the Indians were

Cheyennes who did not want to fight, but wanted to talk. I went out to see the chiefs, while Lieutenant Thompson covered the pack train, and completed the arrangements for attack. I met Dull Knife, Old Crow, and The Wild Hog, Cheyenne chiefs, who said they wanted to go to Spotted Tail's Agency, and not fight the troops. I told them they must come with me to our camp or fight, and gave them a chance to go back to their people and talk. They soon returned and said they would come with me.

We then returned to this camp with them, arriving at dark in a very severe snow-storm. I placed a strong guard over them that night, and the next morning at daylight surrounded them with the troops, took all the arms I could find, and all the ponies, and sent the latter, under charge of Lieutenant Chase, commanding Company A, Third Cavalry, to Camp Robinson, Nebraska.

Distance marched, thirty-six miles; no casualties.

Cheyenne prisoners captured: warriors, 46; women, 61; children, 42; total, 149. Stock captured: ponies, 131; mules, 9; total, 140.

I have the honor to inclose map of scout.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. JOHNSON,
Captain Third Cavalry.

To the ADJUTANT,
Battalion Third Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION THIRD CAVALRY,
Camp near Camp Robinson, Nebr., October 28, 1878.

Respectfully forwarded.

From the moment the troops first saw the Indians until marched to camp, dismounted, and such arms as could be found (in a blinding snow-storm and in a thicket) taken from them, they were continuously on the verge of a conflict. Captain Johnson displayed great skill, firmness, and good judgment.

Not an Indian was lost or a soldier injured.

C. H. CARLTON,
Major Third Cavalry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Omaha Barracks, Nebr., November 6, 1878.

Official copy respectfully transmitted to the assistant adjutant-general, U. S. A., Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri, for the information of the Lieutenant-General commanding.

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, November 11, 1878.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

7792, A. G. O., 1878.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, NEBR. (Received at Chicago, Ill., November 1, 1878.)

To General P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Military Division of Missouri, Chicago, Ill.:

Carlton telegraphs: "Colonel Merritt writes that Red Cloud wishes to visit prisoners here, sent here (?), and to come. Red Cloud requests their knives to be taken from them, as they will kill themselves if necessary to prevent returning south. Also, says those who committed outrages have already escaped north; that those captured had avoided committing outrages. I have every reason to believe that Red Cloud's opinion is correct."

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, November 5, 1878.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

It looks to me as if there was an unnecessary amount of sympathy in the Department of the Platte for these Cheyenne prisoners, and I wish to state, also, that I have had my suspicions that these Indians had some encouragement to come up before they even started. I sympathize with Indians as much as any one, but I think to encourage Indians in opposition to the policy of the government is a matter of doubtful propriety. The condition of these Indians is pitiable, but it is my opinion that unless they are sent back to where they came from, the whole reservation system will receive a shock which will endanger its stability. Most of the reservation Indians are dissatisfied, and if they can leave without punishment or fear of being sent back, they will not stay long. These Indians certainly should be sent back to their reservation, or those at the reservation should be permitted to come north.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

7836, A. G. O., 1878.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., November 8, 1878.

General E. D. TOWNSEND,
Washington, D. C.:

I respectfully urge that some disposition be made of the Cheyenne prisoners now at Camp Robinson. They are a source of great inconvenience and expense situated as at present. The same may be said of the Bannock and Shoshone prisoners at Fort Hall and other places in this division. May I ask you to call the attention of the General of the Army to this request.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

[Telegram.]

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, November 9, 1878.

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Division Missouri, Chicago, Ill.:

The General of the Army in submitting your telegram of the 8th instant (urging action in regard to disposition of Cheyenne, Bannock, and Shoshone prisoners) to the Secretary of War, remarks thereon as follows:

"I have just had a long talk with the honorable Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs on this subject, and believe they will very soon take judicious measures on all these matters."

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

7926, A. G. O., 1878.

[Copy telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., November 13, 1878.

Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,
Washington, D. C.:

Your letter of November 11 received. The friendly Cheyenne prisoners held at Sidney Barracks during the Kansas troubles were started across the country to Fort Reno, under escort of Captain Mauck with five companies of cavalry, on October 20, and are now nearly there.

The hostile Cheyennes captured had to be kept at Camp Robinson in order to have a secure place for them and a sufficient force to guard them. I would advise that the

ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON. 15

decision of the government in their case be kept from them until all arrangements are made complete for carrying it out.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

7966, A. G. O., 1878.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, November 5, 1878.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army:

It looks to me as if there was an unnecessary amount of sympathy in the Department of the Platte for these Cheyenne prisoners, and I wish to state also that I have had my suspicions that these Indians had some encouragement to come up before they even started. I sympathize with the Indians as much as any one, but I think that to encourage Indians in opposition to the policy of the government is a matter of doubtful propriety. The condition of these Indians is pitiable, but it is my opinion that unless they are sent back to where they came from the whole reservation system will receive a shock which will endanger its stability. Most of the reservation Indians are dissatisfied, and if they can leave without punishment or fear of being sent back, they will not stay long. These Indians certainly should be sent back to their reservation, or those at the reservation should be permitted to come north.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

NOVEMBER 19, '78.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose copy of report of Capt. P. D. Vroom, Third Cavalry, dated Red Cloud Agency, October 23, of a scout of his command to intercept hostile Cheyenne Indians. No trails or indications of hostile Indians were seen during the march.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. McCRRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

HEADQUARTERS RED CLOUD AGENCY, D. T.,
October 23, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with telegraphic instructions from headquarters Department of Dakota, of October 5, I left this post on the 6th instant, with Companies E and L, Third Cavalry, numbering two officers and one hundred and five enlisted men, and marched southwest in the direction of White River. I arrived at the old Indian camp at the Forks of White River, distance from the post sixty-two miles, on the 8th instant. At this point I learned that the Red Cloud Indians had left their camp at the head of Pass Creek and had moved to Big White Clay. I also received information that the reports of the destruction of the Rosebud Agency and the stampede of the Spotted Tail Indians were without foundation, and that the troops from that agency had moved south toward the Randall road. I therefore decided to continue my march in a southwesterly direction, and leaving the Forks of White River on the 9th, I followed the old road leading from the mouth of Yellow Medicine Creek to Fort Laramie, the same route taken by the Red Cloud Indians. On the 12th instant I struck the South Fork of White River, near the crossing of the Randall road, at which point I met Capt. H. W. Wessell's Third Cavalry, with the troops from Rosebud Agency. On the 13th instant I marched east with Captain Wessell's command to the second crossing of the South Fork of White River, and at this point received information of the whereabouts of Major Tilford's command. On the 14th I moved west, following the Randall road, and encamped on the 15th at the headwaters of the South Fork of White River. I here learned that Major Tilford, with his command, was at Wounded Knee, that Carlton's and Thornburgh's commands were at Camp Sheridan, and that the hostiles had passed west of the Black Hills. On the 16th instant I started on my return to my post, by way of the Forks of White River, reaching there on the 21st instant. I saw no trails or indications of hostile Indians during the march. Extensive prairie fires prevailed and the whole country between the South Fork of White River and Wounded Knee Creek has been burned over.

The total distance marched by the command was three hundred and seventy miles.

16 ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON

I inclose a sketch of the route traveled, prepared by A. A. Surgeon V. T. McGillycuddy, U. S. A.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. D. VROOM,

Captain Third Cavalry, Commanding Post.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Headquarters Department of Dakota, Saint Paul, Minn.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF DAKOTA,
Saint Paul, Minn., November 5, 1878.

Official copy respectfully forwarded to headquarters Military Division of the Missouri.

JOHN GIBBON,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. A., Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, November 12, 1878.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

8101, A. G. O., 1878.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, November 19, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose, for the information of the General of the Army, the following communications, one addressed to the Hon. Secretary of War and the other to myself, which were handed to me on the 15th instant by his excellency Governor Anthony, of Kansas.

I fully realize the embarrassing condition of affairs in Western Kansas and the desire of the governor to restore confidence to a people in the condition for a panic on the receipt of any rumor of Indian disturbances. His statement about what did occur in the Cheyenne raid which has just gone by is certainly correct. I believe that General Pope thought, as the governor states, that the Indians would not molest property or destroy life, but the Indian is uncertain, and the thoughts and hopes of General Pope were not realized.

What General Pope said to the governor he communicated to me, and I believe he did his best to protect the interest under his charge. It is hard to head off or overtake Indians in an open country, well known to them, with two or three fresh horses for each Indian to ride on as relays, the horses unincumbered by baggage of any kind, while the pursuing force has only the same horses, loaded down to some extent by rations for the man and forage for the animal. The fault was not so much in the chase as in the fact that by our present system the troops could not attack the Indians until they had made good their escape from the reservation, and the additional fact that there were not troops enough on the reservation to chastise them had we the authority. These Indians suffered from want of food at times last winter, to my own knowledge. I saw them when returning from the Staked Plains in a state of semi-starvation; but this is all past, and we must come down to the question before us: Can we send any more troops to the points designated by the governor of Kansas? All the troops in this division are holding places where the danger and interests are the same as in Kansas, and I can think of no relief unless it should be to bring back that portion of the Fourth Cavalry now on the Rio Grande, stripping that exposed frontier for a more imminent necessity, and to order out the Eighteenth Infantry to report to General Pope, to be sent to the points named by the governor, or such other points as may be designated by General Pope. If Colonel Mackenzie and six of his companies could come back I would suggest Fort Wallace for their station. The condition of the settlers in Western Kansas is aptly described by the governor, and if any portion of the Cheyennes at the Fort Reno Reservation should strike north a most pitiable panic would take place. We have not half enough men to protect the people and interests developed by the spread of emigration in the last ten years. I again in the most respectful manner give warning on this subject, and further state that it is embarrassing for officers in charge of operations in the field to give orders to an inadequate force to engage an enemy where total annihilation of the command is the result of defeat, to say nothing of the responsibility to which they are held for the murder of innocent and defenseless settlers and to the horrible outrages on their families.

The Eighteenth Infantry is wanted for Montana in the early spring, but the necessity of restoring confidence in Kansas, so embarrassing for want of troops, makes me respectfully recommend that that regiment be sent to General Pope, hoping that something else may turn up in the spring so that it or some other regiment can then go to Montana. The force on the Rio Grande is small; besides, the law, I believe, fixes the number to be held there, and in recommending that Colonel Mackenzie and the six companies of Fourth Cavalry be withdrawn and sent to General Pope I only hope they might be allowed to come in view of a greater necessity.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

Brig. Gen. E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C.

STATE OF KANSAS, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
Topeka, November 11, 1878.

SIR: On September 9, past, band of Northern Cheyenne Indians escaped from their reservation at Fort Reno, Ind. Ter., and took up their march northward. In their passage across this State, which covered a period of nearly thirty days, they not only evaded capture by the United States military forces, but they committed crimes against life and property savage and revolting in their character, and disastrous in pecuniary loss.

More than forty men were murdered, and many women ravished and worse than murdered. An Indian invasion, so unexpected and so revolting in its fiendish details, has awakened a feeling of profound anxiety and a rightful demand for the adoption of extreme measures to prevent a recurrence.

If this band can be permitted to flee its reservation and traverse two States, plundering and murdering at will before even a portion of their number is captured, and not meet with exemplary punishment, then the reservation system should be abandoned as a failure and the frontier citizen surrendered to a condition of perpetual peril.

To end such undertakings on the part of the Indians, and protect the future from their consequences, an example of adequate punishment should be made in this case. To return this band to their reservation, with its chiefs and leaders, would be a wrong to this State against which I protest in the name and on behalf of its entire population. I cannot believe such thing will be seriously contemplated.

On mature reflection, and with thoughtful reference to the demands of law and justice, as well as the end of public safety, I feel it an imperative duty to call upon you for a surrender to the proper officers of the civil courts of the State of Kansas, for trial and punishment under its laws, the principal chiefs, Dull Knife, Old Crow, Hog, Little Wolf, and others whose identity can be established as participants in the crime of murder and woman-ravishing.

I believe there is a precedent for this demand in the surrender to the civil courts of Texas of Satana and one other chief in the year 1872. But if there were no precedent, public necessity and simple justice would, I believe, be ample justification for this demand.

The laws of Kansas work a practical abolition of capital punishment; but the fact of surrender to the civil authorities for trial, with a conviction, followed by a sentence of death or imprisonment for life, would have a salutary effect, and, as I believe, work protection and comparative security.

Very respectfully,

GEO. T. ANTHONY,
Governor of Kansas.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.

STATE OF KANSAS, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
Topeka, November 11, 1878.

GENERAL: Your attention is respectfully urged to the condition of the citizens of this State, residing upon its western borders, in connection with the late Indian massacres in their midst.

The escape of a band of Northern Cheyenne Indians, under the leadership of Dull Knife, from the Fort Reno Reservation on the 9th of September last, is well known to you. The fact of their escape was almost immediately communicated to me by request of citizens of this State residing near the State line, by demand for arms and ammunition for self-protection, all uniting in a belief in impending danger to both property and life.

These expressions of anxiety and demands for assistance were promptly transmitted to General Pope, commanding the department, who uniformly responded with assurances that no danger need be apprehended; that the escaped Indians were driven out by hunger, and would harm no one beyond the taking of food and ponies, the two things needed and coveted by them. He also assured me of his purpose and ability to capture and return the fugitives without the aid of the State, and before material wrong had been inflicted by the taking of property from our citizens, always insisting that the Indians were inspired by no hostile intent against the lives of the white people. That General Pope believed this, as I did also, there can be no question. That it was a sad error of judgment, time painfully demonstrated. They were not captured and returned, but for nearly thirty days wandered about in broken squads depleting upon life and property, until their final heart-sickening butchery of men and still more horrid cruelties to women and children. Nothing in the record of Indian atrocities excelled the massacre on the Sappa in this instance. A panic followed, which for a time promised a depopulation of a large section of the State, and which was only checked by the issuance of all the arms and ammunition of the State, together with the best authenticated evidence obtainable that the Indians had passed beyond the borders of the State, and now the anxiety and fears of settlers is scarcely less than before, owing to the admitted inefficiency of the military force on duty, as evidenced in its inability to hold the Indians upon their reservation or capture and return them after escape.

Each day brings some new rumor of a new escape and a consequent exodus of settlers. It is useless to attempt a reassurance of the settlers until it aims in an increase of United States forces, or the organization of a State force, for the protection of the frontier. The latter is impracticable for want of both authority and means until provided by legislative enactment, say nothing of the right of the State to look to the General Government for protection. This condition of things is working a serious impairment of State interest. It is driving citizens to an abandonment of their homes, and preventing settlement upon the border, where it was rapid and permanent up to this disastrous check. This lengthy recital is not for the purpose of fault-finding or complaint, but for an intelligent basis of a demand, which I now make, for and in behalf of the State, that an adequate force of troops be promptly sent to the vicinity of Forts Reno and Sill to protect us from further damage by a restoration of confidence and a full assurance of safety.

Trusting to the simple justice of this request, and confident of an early opportunity to announce a compliance therewith,

I am, general, very respectfully,

GEO. T. ANTHONY,
Governor of Kansas.

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN, *Chicago, Ill.*

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, November 22, 1878.

Respectfully submitted to the Hon. Secretary of War.

We cannot withdraw that part of the Fourth Cavalry which is serving on the Rio Grande without raising clamor on that frontier, indeed without incurring real danger of foreign complications. We have not any more troops available for Forts Sill and Reno, and those already there must be strengthened by recruits and stimulated to fresh vigilance and increased activity. The surrender of the murderers from among the prisoners of war held captive—of the Southern Cheyennes who recently escaped from the vicinity of Fort Reno—will result in their proper punishment, and may restrain these Indians from repeating the same game annually.

W. T. SHERMAN,
General.

8207, A. G. O., 1878.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, November 22, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, transmitting a copy of telegram dated Chicago, November 8, 1878, from General Sheridan, urging that some disposition be made of the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson; and in reply would respectfully state that the matter was duly referred to

the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for an expression of his opinion, and that officer, in reply thereto, under date of 16th instant, recommends that all of the Cheyennes in the custody of the military, who were engaged in the recent hostilities, be taken to Fort Wallace or some other military post in Kansas, with a view to the identification of such as committed outrages in said State, and their delivery to the proper civil authorities for trial; and that the remainder of said Indians be returned to their agency in the Indian Territory.

The recommendation of the Commissioner has the approval of this department.

Very respectfully,

C. SHURZ,
Secretary.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF WAR.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, December 5, 1878.

Official copy respectfully submitted to Lient. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, commanding Military Division of the Missouri. The following are the views of the General of the Army: "If these captive Cheyennes move towards their reservation overland, then Fort Wallace will be a good place to keep them until the civil authorities can pick out the particular ones indicted; but if they are sent by rail, then Fort Leavenworth is the better place."

By command of General Sherman.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

8751, A. G. O., 1878.

Copy of indorsements of the Lieutenant-General on 9983, Military Division of the Missouri, 1878, being copy of a letter from the Interior Department, dated November 22, 1878, replying to War Department letter of November 11, inclosing copy of telegram from General Sheridan, and concurring in recommendation of Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson who were engaged in hostilities be taken to Fort Wallace, or other military post in Kansas, with a view to the identification of such as committed outrages in said State, and their delivery to civil authorities for trial, and that the remainder be returned to their agency in Indian Territory.

"If these captive Cheyennes move toward their reservation overland, General Sherman holds that Fort Wallace will be a good place to keep them for the civil authorities, but if they are sent by rail, that then Fort Leavenworth is the better place."

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, December 16, 1878.

Respectfully referred to the commanding general, Department of the Platte, who will direct the Cheyenne prisoners within referred to to be sent under guard by rail to Fort Leavenworth, and reported to the commanding officer of that post.

By command of Lieutenant-General Sheridan.

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Third indorsement. Upon a copy of papers to General Pope.]

Official copy respectfully referred to the commanding general, Department of the Missouri, who will, upon arrival of the Indians at Fort Leavenworth, retain for identification by the authorities of the State of Kansas a number of the principal men, and return the remainder to the agent of the Cheyennes at Fort Reno.

By command of Lieutenant-General Sheridan.

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Headquarters Military Division Missouri, *December 17, 1878.*

Forwarded by Lieutenant-General Sheridan, *December 19, 1878.*

20 ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON

8705, A. G. O., 1877.

[Telegram.]

CHICAGO, ILL., December 20, 1878.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington, D. C. :

General Crook telegraphs that the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson are very much in need of clothing, and asks cannot some clothing be issued them by the Indian Department from annuity goods on hand at Red Cloud or Spotted Tail Agencies, to be charged to the appropriation for support of Cheyenne Indians in Indian Territory.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, December 23, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit for your information copy of telegrams, dated December 20, from General Crook, stating that the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson are very much in need of clothing, and asks whether clothing cannot be issued to them from annuities by the Indian Department at Red Cloud or Spotted Tail Agency.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

53, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

CHICAGO, ILL., January 7, 1879.

General E. D. TOWNSEND,
Washington, D. C. :

The weather has been so extremely cold since the order was given for the removal of the Cheyenne prisoners from Camp Robinson to the Indian Territory that no action could be taken, especially as they are destitute of clothing, and no reply has been received to the appeal made for clothing for them on the 20th ultimo

The following telegram from General Crook on the subject has just been received, and is transmitted, for the information of the General of the Army, to show their temper and ascertain if clothing can be issued to them.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

OMAHA, January 6, 1879.

Lieutenant-General SHERIDAN, *Chicago :*

The following telegram received this morning from Robinson, January 5:

"Assistant Adjutant-General, DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Fort Omaha :

"Am I to understand that I am to issue clothing to Cheyennes? There are forty-nine men, fifty-one women, and forty-eight children. The eleven have not come; they say they will die before returning to the Indian Territory, and I have no recourse but taking their food and fuel away. They have had no food for twenty-four hours. Dull Knife is inclined to give up, but the young men won't allow it. I offered to feed the young children, but the Indians won't allow it.

"WESSELLS,
"Captain Third Cavalry."

It is hard to ask the military to perform this disagreeable duty, more especially if this removal had been made two months ago this great suffering which must ensue, and much of their opposition to going, would have been obviated. Cannot the Indian Department send some one to superintend the movement, and we simply furnish the escort?

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 10, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a telegram of the 7th instant from General Sheridan, repeating dispatches from General Crook and Captain Wessells, showing that on account of the destitute condition of Cheyenne prisoners—their want of food and clothing—the orders for their removal from Camp Robinson to Indian Territory have not been carried out. General Crook asks if the Indian Department cannot send an agent to superintend the move.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

505, A. G. O., 1879.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, January 21, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, transmitting copy of a telegram from Lieutenant-General Sheridan, communicating one from Captain Wessells in reference to the movements of the Cheyenne Indians and as to furnishing them with clothing, and inclose herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter dated the 17th instant, from the Commissioner of Indians (Affairs?) conveying the information that clothing for said Indians was ordered to be shipped from Sidney, Nebr., on the 16th instant.

Very respectfully,

C. SCHURZ,
Secretary.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF WAR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, January 17, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt by reference from the department, of a letter from the Hon. Secretary of War (January 10, 1879), transmitting copy of a telegram from Lieutenant-General Sheridan, communicating one from Captain Wessells in reference to the movement of the Cheyenne Indians, and as to furnishing them with clothing; and in reply would state that the necessary clothing for said Indians was ordered to be shipped from Sidney yesterday, and Lieutenant Johnson so informed.

Very respectfully,

E. A. HAYT,
Commissioner.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

64, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., January 8, 1879.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

Captain Wessells, commanding Camp Robinson, telegraphs that the Indians still refuse to move, but, if not interfered with, he will get them away. Has been holding a large escort for some time at Robinson to take the Indians to the railroad. Escort is rapidly consuming the little hay in the country. Thinks they should move as quickly as possible.

Commissioner Hayt is telegraphing Lieutenant Johnson about clothing for Cheyennes. In case Indian Department cannot furnish clothing, General Crook asks authority to issue from Quartermaster's Department. Answer to this request is respectfully asked.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 10, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herein copy of telegram from General Sheridan dated the 8th instant, communicating one received from Captain Wessells, commanding Camp Robinson, Nebraska, in which he states the Indians still refuse to move, but that, if not interfered with, he will get them away.

Attention is invited to the request of General Crook, therein referred to, for authority to issue clothing to the Cheyennes from the Quartermaster's Department, should the Indian Department be unable to furnish a supply.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

100, A. G. O., 1879.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, January 4, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23d ultimo, with inclosed copy of telegram in relation to needed clothing for the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson, Nebraska; and in reply would say that instructions have been issued to the Indian Office to purchase, in open market, such clothing as may be needed for said Indians, to an amount not exceeding \$500.

Very respectfully,

C. SCHURZ,
Secretary.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF WAR.

[Telegram.]

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, January 10, 1879.

General P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Division Missouri, Chicago, Ill :

Referring to your dispatch of 20th ultimo, Secretary of Interior now reports that instructions have been issued to the Indian Office to purchase in open market, for the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson, such clothing as may be needed for said Indians, to an amount not exceeding \$500.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

8969, A. G. O., 1878.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, December 27, 1878.

SIR: Referring to previous correspondence upon the same subject, I have the honor to transmit, herewith, for your consideration, a copy of a communication dated the 24th instant, from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, making further recommendations in relation to the disposal of certain of the Cheyenne Indian prisoners in the custody of the military authorities.

Very respectfully, &c.,

C. SCHURZ,
Secretary.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF WAR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, December 24, 1878.

SIR: Referring to office letter of November 16, ultimo, recommending the removal of all the Cheyenne prisoners held by the military, to Fort Wallace, with a view to

identifying and delivering those to the civil authorities who were guilty of outrage committed in Kansas, I have now the honor to recommend that the Secretary of War be requested to retain at said fort the balance of the prisoners, or those not included in the above list, in order that we may consider the propriety of selecting others to be sent to Saint Augustine.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. M. LEEDS,
Acting Commissioner.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, January 7, 1879.

Official copy respectfully referred to Lieut. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, commanding Military Division of the Missouri, who will order the prisoners held for further orders, after surrendering the parties indicted.

By command of General Sherman.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

114, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., January 10, 1879.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

The following telegram from General Crook just received.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

The following just received from Captain Wessells:

"FORT ROBINSON, 10th.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Fort Omaha, Nebr.:

"The Cheyennes at 10 p. m. made a break from their building. Thirty-five were recaptured, about thirty killed; eighteen had previously surrendered, making a total of fifty-three in our hands now, including Hog, Crow, and Left Hand, three head men. It is reported to me that Dull Knife is dead, but I am not sure. We will have many more before dark, as the trailing is good and five companies are out.

"WESSELLS,
Captain Third Cavalry, Commanding."

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

156, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., January 13, 1879.

General E. D. TOWNSEND,
Washington, D. C.:

General Crook has obtained, as yet, but meager news of the details of the disturbances at Fort Robinson, but has taken steps to have a full and exact report. It would appear from a telegram, yesterday, from Captain Wessells, who is in pursuit, that the Indians are well supplied with arms and ammunition, which leads to the supposition that arms and ammunition were secreted in the cañon where they first made a stand. They left this place on the night of the 10th, but were again overtaken yesterday and surrounded, not, however, without some loss to the troops. They doubtless will all be captured, and with the highest regard for humanity in doing so. The official reports make the number of Indians killed so far, thirty.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

289, A. G. O., 1879..

[Telegram.]

General P. H. SHERIDAN,
*Chicago :*OMAHA, NEBR., *January 14, 1879.*

The following telegram just received :

"FORT ROBINSON, NEBR., 14th.

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

"Department of the Platte, Fort Omaha :

"Just returned. Yesterday we fired forty rounds of shells, spherical case, and solid shot into the rifle-pits of Indians, and although they burst right around them, none were injured. In the night they got away. This was twenty miles from here, on the Hat Creek road. My command is utterly worn out, but I will try them again with Companies E and H.

"I can't say too much in praise of the zeal of the officers and soldiers of this command.

"WESSELLS,

"Captain Third Cavalry, Commanding."

GEORGE CROOK,

Brigadier-General.

Official :

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,

Chicago, January, 16, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General Commanding.

344, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN,
*Chicago, Ill. :*OMAHA, NEBR., *January 15, 1879.*

The following just received :

"FORT ROBINSON, NEBR., 15th.

"General CROOK,
"Omaha, Nebr. :

"Upon a full investigation of the recent Cheyenne troubles here, I find the facts as follows: On the 3d instant the head men were notified by Captain Wessells that the authorities in Washington decided they must go back south. Without giving a decisive answer they retired to consult with their people. On the next day Hog, as spokesman, gave an unequivocal negative, saying, as had the others on numerous occasions, that they were resolved to die first. A few having been examined and professed willingness to go, were allowed to return to the prison for their effects, but were forcibly detained by the others. The attempt to starve and freeze them out was now the last and only alternative. On the 9th instant it was decided to arrest Hog as the leading oppositionist. He having been with difficulty induced to come out, was ironed, but after a struggle, in which a soldier was stabbed. The Indians in the prison, knowing of this, immediately barricaded the doors and covered the windows with cloth to conceal their movements, tearing up the floor and constructing rifle-pits to command all the windows. From this time the prison was like a den of rattlesnakes, and any white man who had shown his head in the room would have met certain death. It was supposed, of course, that the Indians had no arms other than a few knives. During the evening the building was as quiet as a grave, and the six sentinels who surrounded it suspected no danger. At ten minutes before ten o'clock four shots were fired from the west end of the building, killing two of the sentinels; shots were also fired from a front window into the guard-room, wounding a corporal. Simultaneously a rush was made through all the windows, the Indians sallying out resolved to kill and be killed, like Malays running a muck. The guard and other troops gave chase. The Indians moved south toward the

creek, the squaws being driven in a mass ahead of the men, at least five of the latter keeping up an incessant fire. It was in returning the fire that several women and children were killed. No woman or child was intentionally harmed, and, in fact, many officers and soldiers showed great daring in trying to save them. To take the men prisoners was impossible, as they all refused to surrender, and when exhausted stood at bay. Several soldiers lost their lives in trying to capture such men. No Indian was killed who could have been captured. When these Cheyennes were first captured they were but partially disarmed, and several guns and pistols were taken from them. After they had entered the prison they had ample time to conceal arms under the floors, that place of deposit not being searched.

"The prison had been so guarded that the theory of arms having been introduced subsequently to their incarceration is scarcely tenable; yet events proved that they had at least fifteen guns, in addition to the two obtained from the dead sentinels, and some few revolvers. They are well supplied with knives. There are many proofs that a desperate outbreak was long premeditated. The squaws say that the men feared hanging if they returned south, and that in this affair all expected to die. From the time that they knew their removal was decided upon they were in such a state of mind that were the movement to be attempted in any way it would simply be a question as to who should be killed, white man or Indian.

"Casualties to date: Soldiers, killed, 5; wounded, 7. Indians, captured, 71; killed, 32.

"A company resumed the trail to-day; another will start to-morrow. Please acknowledge receipt.

"W. S. SCHUYLER,
"Aide-de-Camp."

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 18, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

297, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, January 16, 1879.

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN, Chicago :

The following just received :

"FORT ROBINSON, NEBR., 16th.

"General CROOK, Omaha :

"Of the escaped Cheyennes there are fully forty-five not yet accounted for by death or capture. Of these, nineteen are bucks. When last heard from on the evening of 13th, they were about twenty-two miles distant, going northwest. Many of them must be wounded; they traveled very slowly, and when their last intrenchment was examined it was found that at least six shells from the cannon had burst amongst them. As they are quite readily trailed in the snow, it is probable that the troops will overtake nearly all of them. Wessells started with company at 4 this morning, leaving Vroom in command here. I shall get all the information I can about the depredations.

"W. S. SCHUYLER,
"Aide-de-Camp."

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

Official.

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 17, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

296, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, NEBR., *January 16, 1879.*

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN, *Chicago, Ill.:*

The following just received:

“FORT ROBINSON, NEBR., 16th.

“General CROOK, *Omaha, Nebr.:*

“The squaws refuse to talk, but I have interviewed Hog, Crow, and Left Hand. They say that all the young men, including those of their party, were actively engaged in the Kansas outrages, though the old men tried to restrain them; probably at least fifteen of those lately in prison here were engaged in those massacres. Hog and Crow repeat emphatically what I stated in my report, ‘that the Cheyennes would never have been gotten out of their prison alive after they knew that they had to go south.’ The cutting down their rations only made them more desperate because it proved that the government would not change its determination; they feared to be sent to Florida or otherwise severely dealt with; they say that the arms must have been taken apart and concealed in their clothing when first confined, though they refuse to give much information on this point; they also say that if any of the fugitives escape the troops, it is uncertain where they will go, but probably to join Little Wolf, whom they believe to be in the vicinity of the Powder.

“O’Beirne is here, and everything seems to be calm at Red Cloud.

“W. S. SCHUYLER, *A. D. C.*”

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 17, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

318, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

CHICAGO, *January 18, 1879.* (Received 3.12 p. m.)

General E. D. TOWNSEND,
Washington, D. C.:

The following, the latest information from Fort Robinson, is transmitted for information of General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

“OMAHA, *January 18, 1879.*

“Lieutenant-General SHERIDAN,
Chicago:

“The Cheyenne remnant were found intrenched about twelve miles distant from where they were last seen. A band of horses were taken from a ranch on Sidney road, supposed to be by some of Little Wolf’s band. I have ordered troops from Russell after them. Agent from Pine Ridge says the Sioux are much excited over the Cheyenne troubles.

“GEORGE CROOK,
“*Brigadier-General.*”

331, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., January 19, 1879.

General P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Division, Chicago, Illinois:

The Secretary of War, at the instance of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, wishes the commanding officer at Camp Robinson to be instructed, in case he uses any of Red

ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON. 27

Cloud's scouts, to do so more with the object of securing the surrender of the escaped Cheyennes than for the purpose of fighting them. Please convey this instruction as quickly as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN,
General.

CHICAGO, ILL., *January 19, 1879.*

General W. T. SHERMAN,
Washington, D. C. :

Your telegram of this date received, and General Crook duly notified. I have no official information of any intention to use Red Cloud scouts for any purpose. I feel somewhat disgusted at the manner in which the whole Cheyenne business has been conducted at Fort Robinson.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

358, A. G. O., 1879.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, January 14, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor respectfully to invite your attention to the inclosed copy of a letter of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of the 8th instant, referring to previous correspondence upon the subject of action in relation to the Cheyenne prisoners, copies of which have been duly transmitted to the War Department, and recommending that after those identified by the citizens of Kansas have been given up to the civil authorities for punishment, certain of the remaining Indians, as indicated in his letter, be taken to Saint Augustine, Fla., as was done after the cessation of hostilities in 1875, in the case of the Kiowas, Cheyennes, and Arapahoos.

Very respectfully, &c.,

C. SCHURZ,
Secretary.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF WAR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, January 8, 1879.

SIR: Referring to office letter of November 16 and December 24, ultimo, in relation to the removal of all the Cheyenne prisoners to Fort Wallace, Kansas, with a view to the identification of those guilty of outrages in that State, and the proper disposition to be made of the remainder, I have now the honor to state that after the cessation of hostilities in 1875 on the part of Kiowas, Cheyennes, and Arapahoos, seventy of the ringleaders in that outbreak, guilty of various crimes, were selected by the military from the large number then held as prisoners, and, under the order of the President, taken by the War Department to Saint Augustine, Fla. The effect of this treatment was most happy, not only upon the prisoners but upon other members of the tribe. I therefore respectfully recommend that after the civil authorities have identified and taken charge of those guilty of the outrages referred to, in Kansas, all the remaining full-grown men be taken to Florida and subjected to the same treatment and discipline as were those in 1875, and that the balance be sent to the agency.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. HAYT,
Commissioner.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

Referred to General of the Army for remarks, by War Department.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, January 21, 1879.

Respectfully submitted to the Hon. Secretary of War.

I understand that the wish of the Indian Bureau is that the Cheyenne prisoners still at Camp Robinson be taken to some point of safety, preferably Fort Leavenworth, where the civil authorities may take such as are indicted for murder for trial, the remainder to be conducted by the military, at the cost of the Indian Bureau, to the

agency at Fort Reno, Indian Territory, whence they escaped last summer. Now I understand the Commissioner of Indian Affairs asks that the remnant be sent to Saint Augustine, Fla., for instruction, as was done in the case of some Kiowas three or four years ago.

I earnestly advise the Hon. Secretary of War not to consent to this. It devolves heavy cost and labor on the military authorities without a particle of fruit. I advise that as soon as these Indians are conducted by force to Omaha that they be surrendered to an agent of the Indian Bureau, to do as that bureau chooses.

W. T. SHERMAN, *General.*

404, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.—Extract.]

CHICAGO, ILL., *January 22, 1879.*

General W. T. SHERMAN,
* *Washington, D. C.:* *

I have not had anything from Crook for three days, I am quite convinced that there was no unnecessary cruelty at Fort Robinson; on the contrary, the officers were governed by the highest sentiment of humanity throughout. In fact the failure so far to capture the Indians may be attributed to humanity. I blame the bad management in not providing amply against the outbreak. I have called on General Crook for a full report, in compliance with your directions of January 18, and will send you to-day Captain Wessells' report, also briefs of correspondence in this office on the subject of Cheyenne prisoners.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

430, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

CHICAGO, *January 23, 1879.*

General TOWNSEND,
Washington, D. C.:

The following telegram, forwarded by General Crook, just received here.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

“CAMP EIGHT MILES NORTHEAST OF BLUFF STATION,
“*January 23, via Fort Robinson.*”

“General CROOK,
“*Omaha, Nebr.:*”

“Affair with Cheyennes took place yesterday about 2.30 p. m., at a point eight miles east of telegraph line from Robinson to Hat Creek and five miles north of stage road. Cheyennes fought with extraordinary courage and fierceness, and refused all terms but death. Officers and troops behaved with great spirit; those engaged were Captains Wessells and Lawson, and Lieutenants Chase, Hardie, and G. W. Baxter, Third Cavalry, and Lieut. J. Baxter, Ninth Infantry, and Dr. Pettis. Among the wounded are Sergeant Read and Private Dubois, Company H, Third Cavalry. Troops return to stations at once. Indians killed, seventeen warriors, four women, and two children; and nine captured, three of whom are wounded; one man of wounded will probably die.

“EVANS, *Commanding.*”

429, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

CHICAGO, ILL., *January 23, 1879.*

To ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

The following telegram from General Crook received this morning.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

OMAHA, NEBR., January 22, 1879.

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN,
Chicago, Ill.:

The following just received:

“CAMP EAST OF HAT CREEK,
“Via Fort Robinson, Nebr. 21st.

“To General CROOK, Omaha, Nebr.:

“Companies B and D, Third Cavalry, Captain Johnson and Lieutenant Thompson, with myself, found Cheyennes in strong position on cliffs, four miles north of stage road, on 20th, and cut off their progress *heights*. Indians escaped down cliffs in night, and moved east toward Red Cloud Agency, where pursued by Captain Wessells, with Companies A, E, F, and H, which were beneath cliff on prairie. Messenger from Wessells reports he overtook Indians at noon to-day fifteen miles east of Bluff Station, entrenched in a gully, charged them, and killed and captured the entire party. Captain Wessells, First Sergeant Ambrose, Company E, and Indian scout Woman's Clothes wounded; Captain Wessells slightly. Sergeant Taggat, Farrier Boone, and Private Nelson, of Company A, killed. Thirty-two Cheyennes in all; of captives only nine wounded remain alive. They report Dull Knife killed by shell on cliff some days back; the report comes to me verbally and may be supplemented by more accurate details.

“EVANS, Commanding.”

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

524, A. G. O., 1879.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, NEBR., January 23, 1879.

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN,
Chicago, Ill.:

Your dispatch received. My information is that so far from the troops being cruel to the Indians at Robinson, our men ran great risks in trying to save their lives; that some of our men were killed in doing so. I have already convened a board of officers to fully investigate the whole subject.

GEORGE CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 24, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

[Telegram.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, D. C., January 28, 1879.

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Division of Missouri, Chicago, Ill.:

Upon request of the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of War directs that you issue the necessary orders for the release at Fort Robinson of the widows and orphans of the Cheyennes and to deliver them to the care of the Ogallalla Sioux, their relatives, as requested by Red Cloud.

Please acknowledge receipt.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

Note in Adjutant-General's Office, January 28, 1879.

Such correspondence enumerated herein as has been received in this office from the military authorities was, under the rules of the department, furnished the honorable Secretary of War for transmission to the Department of the Interior.

[Special Orders No. 8.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Fort Omaha, Nebr., January 21, 1879.

1. A board of officers to consist of Maj. Andrew W. Evans, Third Cavalry, Capt. John M. Hamilton, Fifth Cavalry, and First Lieut. Walter S. Schuyler, Fifth Cavalry, A. D. C., will assemble at Fort Robinson, Nebr., on the 25th day of January, 1879, or as soon thereafter as practicable, to examine into and report the facts attending the arrest, confinement, disarmament, escape, and recapture of a number of Cheyenne Indians, recently at and in the vicinity of Fort Robinson, Nebr.

The board will make a thorough investigation and full report of all the facts, as well as of the causes which led to them, so that the whole case may be thoroughly and correctly understood.

The board will also express an opinion as to who, if any person in the military service, is to blame in the matter, and will recommend what further action, if any, is in its judgment necessary.

The junior member will record the proceedings.

By command of Brigadier-General Crook.

ROBERT WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

R. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official copy.

Received in Adjutant-General's Office January 28, 1879.

At the invitation of the chairman, Hon. Wm. B. Allison, the Secretary of the Interior appeared before the Senate Committee upon Indian Affairs, and made the following statement:

In response to the letter of the chairman of this committee, I thought it proper to have a statement prepared giving the whole history of the Cheyenne case, from the time of the removal of the Northern Cheyennes to the Indian Territory down to the present time, as far as it could be gathered from the records of the department. With the permission of the committee I will read this statement:

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C., January 23, 1879.

SIR: In compliance with your verbal request for a report in regard to the removal to the Indian Territory of the Northern Cheyennes in May, 1877, I have the honor to submit the following:

By the treaty of May 10, 1868, the Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes agreed to remove to and settle on a reservation among the Crows, the Sioux, or the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes in the Indian Territory.

In the fall of 1873, delegations of the northern and southern branches of the tribes met in Washington, and effort was made to induce the former to accept the cordial invitation of the latter to share their reserve in the Indian Territory; but all overtures were met with decided opposition by the representatives of the northern tribes.

The next Indian appropriation act, approved June 22, 1874, contained a clause prohibiting the Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes from receiving supplies until they should join the rest of their tribe in the south.

Before arrangements for complying with the terms of the act could be perfected, hostilities broke out in the Indian Territory between the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes—as well as the Kiowas and Comanches—and the United States Government; and pending such hostilities, it was deemed inexpedient to undertake the removal of any Indians thither. The Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes were therefore required, before receiving any supplies or annuities, to enter into an agreement to remove to the Indian Territory whenever the government should see fit. This agreement (copy herewith marked A) is dated Red Cloud Agency, November 12, 1874.

In the next appropriation act, approved March 3, 1875, the restrictive clause of the former act was repealed, and it was provided instead, "that said Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes shall, if required by the Secretary of the Interior, remove to their reservation in the Indian Territory, before the delivery of said supplies appropriated for by the foregoing clauses."

The war in the Indian Territory closed in April, 1875, but steps toward effecting the removal were again postponed, because of pending negotiations with the Sioux to

obtain the cession of the Black Hills, and the fear that a disturbance at Red Cloud Agency, which would be likely to result from an attempt to remove the Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, would thwart the efforts of the Black Hills commission to obtain the consent of the Indians to the proposed cession.

On the 16th of October, 1875, this office requested that an order be issued directing those Indians to remove, and that the honorable Secretary of War be requested to take measures to enforce their removal, in case they should decline to obey the order of the department.

In reply, the honorable Secretary of War stated, under date of November 18, 1875, that the matter "has been referred to the military authorities for information, and that it is the opinion of General Sheridan the change should not be made at this time."

Three months later, in February, 1876, the Sioux war broke out, in which the Northern Cheyennes and a small portion of the Arapahoes took prompt and active part as hostiles. The war continued till the spring of 1877, when it was virtually closed in May, by the surrender at Red Cloud Agency of the main body of the Cheyennes.

Meantime the Indian appropriation act of August 15, 1876, had again made the delivery of supplies to these Indians contingent on their removal south.

On the 17th of May, 1877, the office received copy of dispatch of May 15, from General Sheridan to General Sherman (copy herewith, marked C), stating that the Northern Cheyennes, to the number of 1,400, desired to go to the Indian Territory, and strongly urging their removal thither. The office under date of the 18th of May (copy herewith, marked D), telegraphed to the adjutant-general its approval of such removal, and on the 29th received telegram (copy herewith, marked E), from Lieutenant Lawton, that he was *en route* with 972 Cheyennes, whose removal he had been directed to superintend.

I also forward copy of telegram from General Sheridan (marked F), dated the 6th of June, 1877, regretting the failure of the military authorities to completely disarm the Indians before sending them south, and directing General Pope to use his judgment in the matter on their arrival at Fort Reno. With it (marked G) is a copy of report of Major Mizner, commanding Fort Reno, dated August 8, 1877, announcing the arrival of the Cheyennes at the fort on the 5th, and their delivery by him to the United States Indian agent of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency.

Mention is made of their being required to surrender stock before being turned over to the civil authorities, but no demand seems to have been made upon them for the surrender of retained arms.

The northern Arapahoes were shortly after removed to the Wind River Reserve in Wyoming.

When the Northern Cheyennes arrived at their new agency, they said that they had come there to try it and see how they liked it; that if they did not like it, they would go back north again. Dull-Knife's band wanted the distribution of supplies made to the chiefs instead of to heads of families, as is the custom, and the first issue made to heads of families displeased them. Then they compelled the squaws to put the supplies received into a heap, and the chiefs helped themselves first and left the remainder to be divided among their inferiors and the women and children. Afterwards the agent took measures to prevent any further distributions of that kind and delivered only to heads of families. Previous to the 5th day of September, 1878, the agent received information that Dull-Knife and his party were about to go north. On the 5th Agent Miles informed Major Mizner of the fact, and requested that troops might be so placed as to prevent their escape. The same day Major Mizner sent out two companies of cavalry under Captain Rendebrook, who encamped within four miles of Dull-Knife's band. In consequence of their halting at this distance from the Indian camp, the Indians were enabled to make their escape nine hours before the officer in command became aware of the fact. The particulars of the escape and the causes which led to the outbreak are more fully detailed in the reports herewith from Agent Miles, dated September 10 and 24, and November 1 (marked H, I, and J), which fully refute the charge made by officers of the army that the dissatisfaction of the Indians was caused by scanty and irregular rations, which matter I discussed at length in my report to you on the subject dated the 16th of November last. Copies of telegrams from General Sheridan and Major Mizner to the War Department, announcing the escape of the Cheyennes, are herewith (marked K and L).

The campaign against these hostiles on the part of the army is well known, and also the surrender of the Indians, to the number of about 150, on the 20th of October last.

The subsequent history of those surrendered, and their escape from the military, with copies of the documents relating thereto, is covered by my communication to you of the 20th instant.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. HAYT.
Commissioner.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

I have further a number of documents relating to the different phases of this affair as set forth in this report. The first is the agreement of the Northern Cheyennes to go into the Indian Territory of November 12, 1874:

RED CLOUD AGENCY, *November 12, 1874.*

We, the undersigned, chiefs and headmen of the Northern Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, do hereby agree to go to the Southern reservation whenever the President of the United States may direct, provided we are allowed to remain at Red Cloud Agency and receive rations and annuity goods until that time arrives.

LITTLE WOLF,
LIMBER,
BIG WOLF,
STANDING ELK,
Cheyennes.

BLACK COAL,
EAGLE DRESS,
WHITE BREAST,
PLENTY BEAR,
OLD EAGLE,
Arapahoos.

I now beg leave to submit a dispatch addressed by General Sheridan to General Sherman:

[Telegram.]

CHICAGO, ILL., *May 15, 1877.*

To General W. T. SHERMAN,
Washington, D. C.:

Colonel McKenzie telegraphs me that the Northern Cheyennes, numbering in all not over fourteen hundred (1,400) desire to go to the Southern agency at Fort Reno on the Canadian River, Indian Territory, and that one (1) officer and twelve (12) men can move them there. I have consulted General Pope, who says he has no objection, and that he can perfectly control them, and that no bad result will happen to the Indians there. I therefore strongly urge that McKenzie be allowed to send them to the Indian Territory, and if the Commissioner of Indian Affairs will only say the word, off they shall go quickly; and the remainder of the tribe who surrendered to Colonel Miles at Tongue River can be sent by steamboat and rail to same place.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, *May 16, 1877.*

Official copy respectfully furnished for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. If the decision is communicated to this office it will be at once telegraphed to General Sheridan.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Adjutant-General.

Upon this the following answer was returned by the Indian Office:

[Telegram.]

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C., May 18, 1877.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY:

This department heartily approves the proposed removal, and if it can be made without any expense beyond that of furnishing the Indians with suitable rations while en route, desires it to begin immediately.

The rations can be supplied by purchases made on account of this office, or, if made on account of the War Department, that department will be promptly reimbursed. As the military organization is better adapted for such a movement, it is preferable that it be made under the sole direction of Lieutenant-General Sheridan. Please keep this office promptly advised of the action which may be taken.

S. A. GALPIN,
Acting Commissioner.

Upon these dispatches and orders the Cheyennes were removed to the Indian Territory. Telegram from Lieutenant Lawton to the Commis-

ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON. 33

sioner of Indian Affairs, stating that the Northern Cheyennes are *en route* to the Indian Territory :

[Telegram.]

WHITE CLAY, NEBR., May 28, 1877.

COMMISSIONER INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C. :

In compliance with Special Orders No. 128, paragraph 6, Headquarters Camp Robinson, Nebraska, May 25, 1877, I have the honor to report that I left Red Cloud Agency this day in charge of the Northern Cheyenne tribe of Indians, numbering 972 people, *en route* for the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency, Indian Territory, and will probably reach that point in sixty days, being compelled to move slowly on account of limited transportation.

H. W. LAWTON,
Lieutenant Fourth Cavalry.

The understanding was that the Cheyennes should be disarmed before they were delivered to the civil agent, but General Sheridan himself complains, upon a report which he had received, that the disarming was very incomplete :

[Copy telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, Ill., June 6, 1877.

General JOHN POPE,
Fort Leavenworth, Kans. :

Your letter about Cheyenne Indians received. When I sent my dispatch of 15th May I was under the impression that the Cheyennes had been disarmed and dismounted, and am sorry it was not most thoroughly done. You will have to use your own judgment, after the Indians reach Fort Reno, as to the best procedure in the case. General Townsend's telegram of May 18 (copy sent you) authorizes the Indians to be fed at military posts, and bills sent to Indian Bureau for payment.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, June 13, 1877.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit, for your information, copy of a telegram of the 6th instant from General Sheridan to General Pope, in relation to the subsistence of Cheyenne Indians *en route* to Indian Territory.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. F. CROSBY,
Chief Clerk, for the Secretary of War in his absence.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

August 8, 1877:

HEADQUARTERS, FORT RENO, I. T., August 8, 1877.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that 937 Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes from Red Cloud Agency, Nebraska, under charge of First Lieut., H. W. Lawton, Fourth Cavalry, arrived at this post at noon on Sunday, the 5th instant, and have since been enrolled and transferred to the United States Indian agent at the Cheyenne and Arapaho Agency.

Previous to transferring these Indians to the agent, all stock belonging to the Laramie Stock Association of Wyoming Territory that could be identified by its agent were taken from the Indian herd. A special report in reference to this matter will be submitted at an early date.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. K. MIZNER,
Major Fourth Cavalry, Commanding.

The ASSISTANT-ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Department of the Missouri,
Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
Fort Leavenworth, Kans., August 15, 1877.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army through Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri, for the information of higher authority.

JOHN POPE,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. A., Commanding.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION MISSOURI,
Chicago, August 18, 1877.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army for information of the Indian Bureau.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General, Commanding.

September 10, 1878. This is a report from Agent Miles to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs respecting the circumstances of the leaving of the Cheyennes :

UNITED STATES INDIAN SERVICE,
CHEYENNE AND ARAPAHO AGENCY, I. T.,
September 10, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 5th instant word was brought to me by a number of Indian police that some of the Northern Cheyennes had left the reservation with the intention of going north. Instructions were immediately given that all the Northern Cheyennes should report at this office the next day to the end that the exact number of those who had left the reservation could be ascertained; and information was also given Col. J. K. Mizner, commanding at Fort Reno, that the supposition was a party had left. Colonel Mizner immediately sent out a party of troops to watch movements and be prepared to take such steps as would seem necessary when the number of deserters had been fully ascertained. On the 7th instant word was again sent them to move in and be enrolled, they not having complied with the first order. At that time they acknowledged that a party of about twenty-five were absent, but that this party had not gone off, but were hunting deer, &c., on the salt plains, and the supposition was that the delay was due to their desire to wait until this party returned.

Last evening a party of them came in and acknowledged three or four foolish young men had gone north, and stated that while they were all right they did not want to move in, fearing something bad would happen. They were assured that no harm would be done them; that the enrollment ordered was simply to enable this office to know if they spoke the truth; that it was not the desire of any one to injure in any way those who had remained, but simply to punish those who had left. While they were in the office Colonel Mizner came over from the post, and, confirming all I had told them of the purpose of the enrollment, further told them that his troops were near them without intent to injure one of them; that they must obey the orders they had received or suffer the consequences, and gave them until to-night to move into the agency and occupy the camping-ground assigned them.

At 3 a. m. to-day the captain of Indian police and American Horse, one of the Northern Cheyenne chiefs, aroused me with the information that the majority of the disaffected Northern Cheyennes had left at about 10 p. m. last night, leaving their lodges standing. American Horse, with eight lodges, had withdrawn from the main body, with the loss of nearly all his property. Colonel Mizner was immediately notified, and this morning, at my request, the troops were started in pursuit, accompanied by fifteen Indian police as trailers and guides, and probably by other Indians, from whom the Cheyennes had stolen stock. The number which had left, as nearly as it is possible to tell until matters settle a little more, is 353, under the following chiefs, viz: Dull Knife, Wild Hog, Little Wolf, Crow Indian, Chewing Gum, Old Bear, Squaw, Black Horse, Day, and Red Blanket. Of the number gone, 92 are men, 120 women, 69 boys, and 72 girls.

This disaffection is confined entirely to the Northern Cheyennes, and the Southern Cheyennes gave them neither encouragement nor assistance, and are in no wise affected by the action of those who have left.

Very respectfully,

JOHN D. MILES,
*United States Indian Agent.*Hon. E. A. HAYT,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

Now comes a dispatch communicated to me on September 13, 1878, by the chief clerk of the War Department:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, September 13, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a telegram of the 12th instant, from headquarters Division of the Missouri, repeating one of the 10th from the commanding officer of Fort Reno, Ind. T., reporting that the discontented Northern Cheyennes,

ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON. 35

under "Little Wolf," and others, left their agency for the north, expecting to fight as they go. The troops are in pursuit.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. F. CROSBY,

Chief Clerk, for the Secretary of War in his absence.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[Special Orders No. 163.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Fort Leavenworth, Kans., September 11, 1878.

[Extract.]

* * * * *
4th. The commanding officer of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, will mount a force of about one hundred infantry, to proceed without delay, by rail, hence to Fort Wallace, Kans., and report to the commanding officer of that post for duty in connection with the pursuit and interception of Northern Cheyennes, reported escaped from their agency.

The Quartermaster's Department will furnish the necessary transportation.

* * * * *
By command of Brigadier-General Pope.

E. R. PLATT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Official:

C. S. ISLEY,
Captain Seventh Cavalry, A. D. C.

[Copy telegram.]

CHICAGO, ILL., September 12, 1878.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

The following telegram from General Pope, of yesterday, is respectfully forwarded.

F. D. GRANT,
Lieutenant-Colonel, A. D. C.

The following is just received from commanding officer at Fort Reno:

"Under date of 10th instant, Agent Miles reported at 3.35 a. m. that the discontented Northern Cheyennes, under Little Wolf, Dull Knife, Crow, and Hog, numbering about three hundred and sixty of all ages, among them about ninety men, left their lodges during the night for the north, and expect to fight as they go.

"The troops found the entire camp of sixty lodges standing this morning and the Indians gone, leaving everything behind them.

"The cavalry, two companies, under Rendlebrock, left early this morning in pursuit, and will pursue vigorously. Effort should, if possible, be made to intercept these Indians at the Arkansas, near Fort Dodge, by fresh troops. Rendlebrock is instructed to ask Hambright to send cavalry from Supply to assist him.

"I would like a company of cavalry from Sill.

"MIZNER, Major."

JOHN POPE,
Brevet Major-General, Commanding.

Here is a communication from Agent Miles relative to the cause of their leaving:

[Copy telegram.]

DARLINGTON, IND. TER., September 24, 1878.
(Via Fort Sill, Ind. Ter.)

HAYT, *Commissioner Indian Affairs,*
Washington, D. C.:

Among the causes assigned to explain the reason why the Cheyennes left this agency are, non-fulfillment of the treaty made with them in 1876, the full rations promised therein not being issued. Houses were promised the chiefs, and assistance to build promised others. The Indian police reported on 5th instant that these Cheyennes were

stealing horses from the others, and that a few had left the agency, and that the balance of the discontented ones were preparing to follow.

To ascertain the truth or falsity of this report, an enrollment of all male adult Northern Cheyennes was ordered; all those who had affiliated with the Southern Cheyennes promptly obeyed; the balance acknowledged the absence of a party, but claimed that they were hunting deer near the Salt Plains, and after delays and excuses demanded a modification of the enrollment order, which being refused, they left the agency on the night of the 9th instant. Report was made to your office 10th instant, giving substantially these reasons, and stating the number of renegades to be three hundred and fifty. Subsequent investigation tends to reduce this number slightly, and there is no reason to believe that any Indians have left this agency except the original party. The Cheyennes leaving further complained the country was unhealthy; that they were very sickly and unable to get medicine, and that a great many had already died during their stay here. The chiefs claimed the issue of rations and annuities to the families ignored their importance, and was a source of discontent. They could have been satisfied at this point had we robbed the women and children for their benefit.

MILES, *Agent*.

The cause of the dissatisfaction among the Northern Cheyennes, which led to their breaking out, has been a matter of dispute, some military officers asserting that it was owing to starvation. I ordered a searching inquiry into this matter, and here are the statements of Agent Miles and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in regard to it, showing in the first place that they received what the treaty provided for, and that they were as well supplied as the four thousand Indians who remained on the agency:

CHEYENNE AND ARAPAHOE AGENCY, INDIAN TERRITORY,

November 1, 1878.

SIR: I have received your letter of October 16, 1878, inclosing an article, clipped from the New York Times of the 15th ultimo, touching the causes which led to the recent outbreak among the Northern Cheyennes.

I have submitted, patiently as I could, to the criticisms of the press, and have in no instance attempted to answer the unjust strictures made, believing that an attempt to do so would involve the expenditure on such defenses of much more time than I am able to spare from my official duties; but when a newspaper of the character and standing of the New York Times joins in the hue and cry raised by petty journals throughout the land, perhaps the time is ripe and the occasion opportune to embrace in one communication a reply to all.

Conceding to the late Colonel Lewis honesty of purpose in making his report to General Sheridan that the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were in a starving condition, living on short rations irregularly delivered, I yet submit that he was in no position to know that this state of affairs existed. He was in command of Fort Dodge, Kans., a military post distant from the camps of these Indians 235 to 250 miles, and he never visited the Indians nor did the Indians visit him. His official statement was made on the authority of one Amos Chapman, a scout employed at Camp Supply, Indian Territory, and it is very easily susceptible of proof that Chapman made but one trip to this country, had but little to do with any Indians except some Cheyenne women with whom he bargained for purposes of prostitution, the balance of his time at this place being spent in carousing at Fort Reno. No blame attaches to Colonel Lewis for believing a government employé, even when that employé's reports are mere fictions; and I state as a matter of fact, the proof whereof is overwhelming, that no such thing ever happened on this reserve as these Northern Cheyennes or any other Indians being *compelled* or obliged to eat decayed or any other kind of horse meat, either at the time specified or at any other time. I furthermore state and can prove by military and civilians of undoubted honor, that these Indians received a daily ration of three pounds of beef, it being issued in that proportion to each one alike, whether suckling babes or stalwart men, and that on two issue days immediately preceding their departure these Northern Cheyennes received, in common with every other Indian on the reserve, an extra issue of beef fully equivalent in value and nourishment to the flour not issued, for the very simple reason there was none on hand to give them; the lateness of the appropriation made by Congress and the time necessarily required for advertising, filing bonds, and awarding contracts, manufacturing, inspecting, and delivery of the flour at the agency in the Indian Territory by wagons, a distance of about one hundred and twenty miles, will account for its non-arrival at an earlier date.

The Interior Department, through the Indian Office, promised these Northern Cheyennes a daily ration, as set forth in section 5, treaty September 26, 1876, viz:

"In consideration of the foregoing cession of territory and rights, and upon full compliance with each and every obligation assumed by the said Indians, the United States

does agree to provide all necessary aid to assist the said Indians in the work of civilization, to furnish to them schools and instruction in mechanical and agricultural arts, as provided for by the treaty of 1868. Also to provide the said Indians with subsistence, consisting of a ration for each individual of a pound and a half ($1\frac{1}{2}$) of beef (or in lieu thereof one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) pound of bacon), one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) pound of flour, and one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) pound of corn; and for every one hundred rations four (4) pounds of coffee, eight (8) pounds of sugar, and three (3) pounds of beans, or in lieu of said articles the equivalent thereof, in the discretion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Such ration, or so much thereof as may be necessary, should be continued until the Indians are able to support themselves. Rations shall in all cases be issued to the head of each separate family; and whenever schools have been provided by the government for said Indians no rations shall be issued for children between the ages of six and fourteen years (the sick and infirm excepted), unless such children shall regularly attend school. Whenever the said Indians shall be located upon lands which are suitable for cultivation, rations shall be issued only to the persons and families of those persons who labor (the aged, sick, and infirm excepted); and, as an incentive to industrious habits, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs may provide that such persons be furnished in payment for their labor such other necessary articles as are requisite for civilized life. The government will aid said Indians as far as possible in finding a market for their surplus productions and in finding employment, and will purchase such surplus as far as may be required for supplying food to those Indians, parties to this agreement, who are unable to sustain themselves; and will also employ Indians, so far as practicable, in the performance of government work upon their reservation."

The beans specified were not furnished, but fully their value was furnished in baking powder, lard, salt, soap, and tobacco, none of which, as will be observed, were specified in that treaty to be furnished them.

In furnishing articles in lieu of those mentioned in the treaty the government complied with the spirit of the treaty and in a manner to a great advantage to the Indians. How far would the three pounds of beans daily to one hundred persons have mitigated the pangs of hunger? It would not have been sufficient to have satisfied one healthy man.

Basing my conclusion on an absolute knowledge of all the facts, I state that, in the aggregate, these Northern Cheyennes received fully all that their treaty entitled them to.

The single ration, as established by the department, might not be sufficient for a healthy adult, yet as the same ration is issued to all without regard to age, *babies included*, it certainly is sufficient to sustain life without any reasonable grounds for want. As, for instance, in a family of five persons, there will be usually one small child who does not require meat, and consequently this ration of beef is distributed among the remaining four.

It is the improvident habit of these people to consume the weekly issue of beef during the first three or four days after it has been issued, and the time intervening until the next issue has to be eked out by the indolent with the flour and small ration. All who occupy their time at work do not as a general rule require so much; but those with nothing in the world to occupy their minds fully nine-tenths of the time, they naturally take an interest beyond that of an industrious man in the gorging of their stomachs. Therefore, I submit that the "certain specific rations which were to be given the Northern Cheyennes, in consideration of their willingness to live in the Indian Territory," were actually given either as specified or in their equivalents.

It is also a noticeable fact that while an Indian is a tremendous eater, he is also possessed with a wonderful faculty for fasting, and can endure greater privation from food, with less real suffering and fatigue on a march, than the average white person.

In regard to the two or three issues of coffee and sugar withheld from this band and yet given to the Southern Cheyennes, I have to state that the coffee and sugar were withheld as stated, and under the authority given, but that it was withheld alike from those Northern and Southern Cheyennes who utterly refused to work. Under the treaty with these Indians they agree to assist in their own support, and it was to compel an attempt to perform what they promised that this measure was taken. Shall only the government abide by its part of the agreement? Shall the few obstinate Indians that may chance to be located at an agency be allowed to ignore their share of the contract with perfect impunity for fear of creating a disturbance? I believe, for the good of this class of Indians themselves, and for the sake of the many who are better disposed, every good citizen will say, no. The season for them to make an "attempt" (and I was willing to accept the "attempt") to farm and try and become self-supporting was at hand. The treaty they were governed by required them to work, department regulations required that they should work, yet they flatly refused to touch a plow or handle a hoe. Was not the desire of the government to enforce an obligation voluntarily entered into natural and right?

The endeavor has been made by some parties to fix the whole odium of the breach of contract upon the government, whereas the first breach was made by this band of

Indians, in their refusal to comply with that stipulation of their treaty requiring them to endeavor to become *self-sustaining*—a condition so much desired by every American citizen.

How far the Cheyenne chiefs who signed the treaty of September 26, 1876, represented the people for whom they signed at the time, I cannot say. The government, under that treaty, holds it as affecting every one of them, but not one of the chiefs who left this agency September 9, 1878, signed that treaty, and on more than one occasion one of the chiefs who left informed me in substance that he had never made a treaty, and had only come south on trial and under great pressure, and have continually talked of returning and threatened to return when matters did not go to suit them.

The causes which, in my judgment, induced these Indians to leave have been previously reported by me to the department, and may be summed up in brief as follows, viz:

1st. They demanded the issue of rations *in bulk to bands*, instead of "heads of families" as provided by treaty and regulations.

2d. Refusal to make any effort at labor with the view to ultimate self-support, and the consequent withholding of three issues of sugar and coffee only—fully supported by treaty and regulations.

3d. By their own talk and acts they had become so obnoxious to a large portion of their own people and those of the Southern Cheyennes and Arapahoes as to be forced to camp to themselves, thus barring all means of affiliation and reconciliation through the well-disposed Indians, and when thus separated from better influences were continually planning and plotting to get back north.

4th. Since these Indians left, information has been given by trustworthy Southern Cheyennes that this party of Northern Cheyennes (937) transferred to this agency in August, 1877, brought with them, and had in their possession, over one hundred Springfield carbines, being the arms captured by them from General Custer's command at the time of his death. The very fact of these Indians having successfully secreted these arms during their journey south and since their arrival at the agency, encouraged them in the belief that they were in the possession of the means by which they could cut their way back north at such time as they might consider most opportune. Had this band of Indians been disarmed (as I was led to believe they had), as *all captive hostiles should be*, and dismounted, there would not have been the least possible show for them to have taken such desperate chances.

Col. J. K. Mizner, commanding Fort Reno, Idaho, under date October 25, 1878, in answer to a communication of my own dated October 22, of same year, bearing upon this subject, makes the following statement, viz: "In reply to your letter of 22d instant, asking information as to whether the 937 Northern Cheyennes who arrived at this post under charge of Lieutenant Lawton, Fourth Cavalry, August 5, and who were turned over to you August 8, 1877, were disarmed previous to their arrival here, or by me before being turned over to your charge, I have to state that I understood that these Indians *had been disarmed* previous to their leaving Red Cloud Agency, but I had no official information to that effect." Thus it will be observed that the impression was gained that they *had been disarmed*, while in fact they were not.

The agent has been directly and inferentially charged with furnishing these Indians with arms and ammunition, and of a *superior quality* to that of the Army.

As to the *first* charge I answer that it is without foundation; and as to the last, if there was any "superiority" in the matter it must have existed in the manner of *handling them*, as the pattern in their possession, as stated by the Southern Indians, must have consisted mainly of the Springfield carbine.

I cannot conceive how any thinking person could imagine that a civil agent would wish or even dare to place weapons in the hands of Indians who might bring them to bear against himself and an unarmed force of employes. The agent, with his family, of all others, desires that every bad Indian be disarmed.

The office of Indian agent was for years the synonym for fraud, and it is now almost a hopeless task for an agent to prove his honesty. Each outbreak of the naturally wild Indian who cannot brook the restraints of civilization, no matter what the real cause may be, is attributed by an unthinking and unjust public to the agent's faults. For my own conduct and actions in all public matters, I court the most searching investigation and am willing to abide the judgment of any number of fair-minded men whenever it is thought expedient to investigate the conduct of this agency and its relations to the recent outbreak of the small band of Northern Cheyennes under the leadership of Dull Knife:

Very respectfully,

JNO. D. MILES,
United States Indian Agent.

Hon. E. A. HAYT,
Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

I might say in reference to the report made by Agent Miles that he is looked upon as a good agent and a man of integrity and capacity, and I have in my possession letters of officers of the Army at Fort Reno, who speak of him in the highest terms. I now present the special report addressed to me by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs concerning this matter:

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, November 16, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of Agent John D. Miles on the Cheyenne outbreak. This paper is so full and complete in all its statements that it leaves very little to be added to give an accurate history of the whole transaction.

The first inquiry in order is to ascertain and set forth precisely the amount of supplies of various kinds due to the Northern Cheyenne Indians under the agreement of September 26, 1876. The total number of these Northern Cheyennes is 937. The total amount of beef due them under the treaty for the year ending July 1, 1878, would be 914,256 pounds, or in lieu of that 152,376 pounds of bacon; the amount of beef given to them was 1,151,088 pounds, to which add bacon and lard, 16,204 pounds. The amount of flour to which they were entitled by the treaty was 152,376 pounds; the amount given to them was 159,024 pounds. The amount of corn due to them under the treaty was 152,376 pounds; the amount of corn given them was 6,792. The amount of coffee due to them under the treaty was 12,190 pounds; the amount of coffee actually given them was 9,923 pounds. The amount of sugar due to them under the treaty was 24,380 pounds; the amount of sugar given to them was 20,315 pounds. The amount of beans required by the treaty was 9,142½ pounds, of which none were given.

In addition to the amount required by the treaty there was given to them 2,512 pounds of salt and 2,483 pounds of soap, besides tobacco and baking-powder.

By the treaty they were entitled to receive, during the year, supplies to the money value of \$32,316; they actually received supplies to the money value of \$35,204. This statement disposes of all the clamor that has been current during the year that these Indians did not receive rations to the amount to which they were entitled under the treaty.

On the 1st of July last 80 Northern Cheyennes who had previously been fed with the Southern Cheyennes were transferred to the Northern Cheyenne party, increasing its numbers to 1,017, and full treaty rations for those 1,017 Indians from the 1st of July to the 7th of September, inclusive, would cost in money \$8,345. The amount of rations given them, exclusive of corn raised by themselves, would amount to \$7,743; if we add to that the value of the corn raised, which is proper to be considered in this connection, the total amount of the money value of their supplies would amount to \$7,991, or \$352 in money value less than the full government ration.

In this connection it would be fair to state that the rations for the year ending July 1, 1878, were nearly \$3,000 greater in money value than the Indians were entitled to by the treaty; and the small deficiency represented by the \$352 was owing to the fact that the Indian appropriation bill was not passed by Congress until the 27th day of May, and the opening of bids for supplies for the new fiscal year took place on the 18th of June, and it was absolutely impossible to make the purchase of supplies and transport them to the agency in season to be available as soon as the supplies were actually needed. Nevertheless the deficiency in amount was so slight that it is impossible to say that these Indians left the reservation for the want of sufficient food.

It should also be considered that the government ration, consisting of 3 pounds of beef (gross), ¼ pound of flour, ¼ pound of corn, and for every 100 rations 4 pounds of coffee, 8 pounds of sugar, and 3 pounds of beans, for every man, woman, and child, is more than sufficient for the ample sustenance of any community in the United States.

Section 3, page 449, United States Revised Statutes, provides "that for the purpose of inducing Indians to labor and become self-supporting, it is provided that hereafter, in distributing the supplies and annuities to the Indians for whom the same are appropriated, the agent distributing the same shall require all able-bodied male Indians between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to perform service upon the reservation for the benefit of themselves or of the tribe, at a reasonable rate of compensation, to be fixed by the agent in charge, and to an amount equal in value to the supplies to be delivered, and the allowances provided for such Indians shall be distributed to them only upon condition of the performance of such labor under such rules and regulations as the agent may prescribe: *Provided*, That the Secretary of the Interior may, by written order, except any particular tribe or portion of tribe from the operation of this provision when he deems it proper and expedient."

It will be seen by the law above quoted that it was the duty of the agent to withhold supplies at times in order to compel the Indians to work if it was possible to get

them to do so. No blame can attach to the agent for attempting to enforce this statutory provision.

I notice that Maj. J. K. Mizner, Fourth Cavalry, commanding at Fort Reno, has made a statement as to the quantity of supplies required by the treaty for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, and opposite which he attempts to place the amount actually purchased for the current fiscal year ending July 1, 1879. His statements are not accurate, and I presume the reason for the inaccuracy is that the facts in the case are not within his reach. There were \$240,000 appropriated by Congress for the support of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe, the Kiowa and Comanche, and Wichita Agencies. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes are entitled under that appropriation to \$133,000, and there is a clause in the appropriation act which permits the Indian Office to use the surplus that may arise in any one of the three tribes to cover any deficiency that may happen to either one. As the Wichitas contribute very largely to their own support there will in all probability be a surplus sufficient to cover a part if not the whole of any deficiency there may be in the Cheyenne and Arapahoe appropriation.

So far there has been expended for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes \$142,329.99, which has purchased for them the following articles: bacon, 40,410 pounds; beef, 3,750,000 pounds; baking-powder, 1,500 pounds; beans, 20,000 pounds; coffee, 38,000 pounds; corn, 150,000 pounds; flour, 600,000 pounds; hominy, 2,500 pounds; lard, 10,000 pounds; salt, 15,000 pounds; soap, 10,000 pounds; sugar, 80,028 pounds; tea, 50 pounds; tobacco, 4,500 pounds.

In addition to the amount of beef purchased above, we are entitled under the contract to call for 25 per cent. more, which would make the total amount of beef available for the year under the contract 4,787,500 pounds, an amount of beef which will be quite sufficient for the purposes of the agency.

Maj. J. K. Mizner by his want of familiarity with the subject is led into a serious error in his published statement, by his assumption that the treaty calls for both beef and bacon, when, in fact, it calls only for beef or bacon, and it is also determined by the treaty that one-half pound of bacon is equivalent to one and one-half pounds of beef net or to three pounds of beef gross; and by his method of figuring he arrives at the conclusion that there is a deficiency under the treaty so far, in the purchases for the current fiscal year, of 2,807,421 pounds of supplies. We have at present purchased within 464,774 pounds of the aggregate weight of the supplies called for by the terms of the treaty; and this is based upon the highest actual number of Indians that have been fed at any time at the agency. We are entitled under the beef contract to call for an additional quantity of 937,500 pounds, which when taken will make 472,000 pounds more than the treaty requires.

The following is an accurate statement of the amount of supplies called for by the treaty for the largest number of Indians ever fed at the agency, and also showing the amount actually purchased so far for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1879.

	Supplies called for by treaty.	Supplies actually purchased.
Beef or its equivalent in bacon..	4,542,562 pounds gross.	4,787,500 pounds gross.
Flour	757,085	600,000
Coffee	60,566	38,000
Sugar	121,132	80,028
Beans	45,422	20,000
Corn	757,085	150,000
Hominy		2,500
Lard		10,000
Soap		10,000
Salt		15,000
Tobacco		4,500
Baking-powder		1,500
Tea		50
Total	6,283,852	5,719,078 pounds.
Provided to be called for under contract for beef		937,500
		6,656,578 pounds.

Major Mizner further states that "during the latter part of the winter and the early part of spring the beef was very poor, and was complained of by the Indians; it was really bad." And yet it was accepted by Lieut. William Morrison, a military officer under Major Mizner, detailed for the purpose of seeing that the Indians had good merchantable beef cattle issued to them. Major Mizner further states that from the 1st of July to the 1st of September "the rations lasted for three of the seven days." Undoubtedly they did last for three days, and while, in fact, they were sufficient for seven days, Major Mizner intended to have it inferred that they were sufficient for only three days. In order to ascertain that such was the fact, it was necessary for him to

visit the lodges of over 5,000 Indians and take a detailed inventory of their food supply. In opposition to such a random statement, which has been quoted with his other assertions, are the facts given herewith of the daily ration issued for every man, woman, and child at the agency.

Major Mizner says further, "If they [the Indians] are left with the means to go to war, we simply sleep on a volcano." "I have also to ask that any Indians sent from the north to this department be disarmed and dismounted before being sent here." It is plainly the duty of the military authorities to disarm and dismount the Indians. It is not the duty of the civil agent, nor has he the power to disarm and dismount; and the fact that these Indians had arms is certainly not the fault of the agent, as has been charged, but the blame rests elsewhere.

The statements to which this letter is a reply in detail are of the same character as the unfounded assertions put forth almost daily in regard to the administration of Indian affairs, and I would respectfully submit whether it would not be proper for officers in government service to ascertain the facts in each and every case before making unwarranted publications.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. A. HAYT, *Commissioner.*

Hon. C. SCHURZ,
Secretary of the Interior.

I have here a number of papers referring to the same subject, mostly War Department dispatches and reports, which can be copied and placed at the disposal of the committee, if desired. But I suppose they form part of the communication addressed to the committee by the War Department.

Here is a dispatch referring to the military history of the case:

CHICAGO, *September 19, 1878.*

(Received, Washington, September 19, 1878—2.50 p. m.)

To General E. D. TOWNSEND,
Washington, D. C. :

On the 9th of this month about three hundred of the Southern Cheyenne Indians at their agency at Fort Reno broke away from the agency, leaving their tents and property behind. They were immediately pursued by the troops. Captain Rendlebrock, with two companies of the Fourth Cavalry, coming up with them last Friday at or near the Cimarron, an engagement took place in which his command lost three men killed and three wounded and several horses wounded. The attack was unsuccessful and Captain Rendlebrock fell back towards Camp Supply, reporting that he engaged one hundred and thirty Indian warriors who surrounded and attacked him while their families moved on north. Preparations have been made by General Pope to meet these Indians at or near the crossing of the Arkansas and along the line of the Kansas and Pacific Railway, also in Department Platte along and north of the Union Pacific Railroad. There is strong hope that the troops will be able to meet with them and capture or destroy them.

The Indians have for their principal grievance insufficient food and irregularity in its delivery, then the unwise permission given the Arapahoes to live out near the Big Horn Mountains, the Cheyennes claiming to have as much right to live there as the Arapahoes.

It is important for the peace of the plains and the success of the reservation system that these Indians be captured, and every effort will be made to accomplish that purpose.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, September 23, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose for your information copy of telegram from General Sheridan, reporting the breaking away of 300 Southern Cheyenne Indians from their agency at Fort Reno, Indian Territory, on the 9th instant, and an engagement with them at or near Cimarron, by Captain Rendlebrock and a portion of the Fourth Cavalry, who followed in pursuit, also the steps taken to capture them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[Copy telegram.]

In the following dispatch General Sheridan advises that the captive Cheyennes be returned to the Indian Territory :

OMAHA, NEBR., November 1, 1878.

To General P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Military Division of Missouri, Chicago, Ill. :

Carlton telegraphs " Colonel Merritt writes that Red Cloud wishes to visit prisoners here sent him and to come. Red Cloud requests their knives to be taken from them, as they will kill themselves if necessary to prevent returning south; also says those who committed outrages have already escaped north; that those captured had avoided committing outrages. I have every reason to believe that Red Cloud's opinion is correct."

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION MISSOURI,
Chicago, November 5, 1878.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

It looks to me as if there was an unnecessary amount of sympathy in the Department of the Platte for these Cheyenne prisoners, and I wish to state also that I have had my suspicions that these Indians had some encouragement to come up before they were started. I sympathize with Indians as much as any one, but I think to encourage Indians in opposition to the policy of the government is a matter of doubtful propriety.

The condition of these Indians is pitiable, but it is my opinion that unless they are sent back to where they came from, the whole reservation system will receive a shock which will endanger its stability.

Most of the reservation Indians are dissatisfied, and if they can leave without punishment or fear of being sent back, they will not stay long.

These Indians certainly should be sent back to their reservation or those at the reservation should be permitted to come north.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, November 11, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herein copy of indorsement of General Sheridan, upon telegram from the commanding general Department of the Platte, dated the 1st instant, repeating one from Major Carlton, stating that Red Cloud desires to visit the Cheyenne prisoners at Omaha, and that they be deprived of their knives, as they will kill themselves rather than return south; and says that those of the prisoners who committed the outrages have escaped north, and that those captured avoided committing outrages.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. F. CROSBY,
Chief Clerk, for the Secretary of War in his absence.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

Upon notification that a number of the runaway Cheyennes were under control of the Army, and in accordance with the advice of General Sheridan, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs addressed to the Secretary of the Interior the following communication :

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE INDIAN AFFAIRS,
November 16, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt by department reference of a letter from the Hon. Secretary of War, herewith, dated 11th instant, inclosing a dispatch from General Sheridan, who calls attention to the necessity of taking some action in regard to disposing of the Cheyenne prisoners held at Camp Robinson. In reply I respectfully suggest that the War Department be requested to take these Indians, and all other Cheyennes held by the military, and who were engaged in recent hostilities,

ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON. 43

to Fort Wallace, or some other military post, within the jurisdiction of Kansas, with a view to identifying such as have committed outrages in that State and delivering them up to the civil authorities thereof for trial.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. A. HAYT, *Commissioner.*

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

This letter was transmitted to the War Department:

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, November 22, 1878.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, transmitting a copy of a telegram dated Chicago, November 8, 1878, from General Sheridan, urging that some disposition be made of the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson; and in reply would respectfully state that the matter was duly referred to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for an expression of his opinion, and that officer in reply thereto, under date of 16th instant, recommends that all of the Cheyennes in the custody of the military, who were engaged in the recent hostilities, be taken to Fort Wallace or some other military post in Kansas, with a view to the identification of such as committed outrages in said State, and their delivery to the proper civil authorities for trial, and that the remainder of said Indians be returned to their agency in the Indian Territory.

The recommendation of the Commissioner has the approval of this department.

Very respectfully,

C. SCHURZ, *Secretary.*

The Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 3, 1879.

SIR: Referring to your letter dated 22d November last, concurring in the recommendation of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in regard to the disposition of the Cheyenne Indian prisoners at Camp Robinson, I have the honor to transmit for your information copy of report dated December 19, 1878, from Lieutenant-General Sheridan, showing his action in regard to the disposition of these prisoners.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

Copy of indorsements of the Lieutenant-General on 9983, Military Division of the Missouri, 1878, being copy of a letter from the Interior Department, dated November 22, 1878, replying to War Department letter of November 11, inclosing copy of telegram from General Sheridan, and concurring in recommendation of Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson, who were engaged in hostilities, be taken to Fort Wallace or other military post in Kansas, with a view to the identification of such as committed outrages in said State and their delivery to civil authorities for trial; and that the remainder be returned to their agency in Indian Territory.

"If these captive Cheyennes move towards their reservation overland, General Sherman holds that Fort Wallace will be a good place to keep them for the civil authorities; but if they are sent by rail, that then Fort Leavenworth is the better place."

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, December 16, 1878.

Respectfully referred to the commanding general Department of the Platte, who will direct the Cheyenne prisoners within referred to to be sent under guard by rail to Fort Leavenworth and reported to the commanding officer of that post.

By command of Lieutenant-General Sheridan,

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Third indorsement. Upon a copy of papers to General Pope.]

Official copy respectfully referred to the commanding-general Department of the Missouri, who will upon arrival of the Indians at Fort Leavenworth retain for identi-

44 ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON.

fication by the authorities of the State or Kansas a number of the principal men, and return the remainder to the agent of the Cheyennes at Fort Reno.

By command of Lieutenant-General Sheridan.

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
December 17, 1878.

Official.

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, December 19, 1878.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General Commanding.

The following dispatches refer to the breaking out of the captive Cheyennes from Camp Robinson while they were under the control of the military:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 13, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to inclose for your information copy of telegram from General Sheridan, dated the 10th instant, communicating report of Captain Wessells of the escape of the Cheyenne prisoners confined at Camp Robinson, Nebraska. The troops in pursuit have killed thirty of their number and recaptured fifty-three.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[Telegram.]

CHICAGO, *January 10, 1879.* (Received Washington 4 p. m.)

To ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.:

The following telegram from General Crook just received:

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

The following, just received from Captain Wessells, Fort Robinson, 10th:

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE PLATTE,
Fort Omaha, Nebr.:

"The Cheyennes, at 10 p. m., made a break from their building; thirty-five were recaptured; about thirty killed; eighteen had previously surrendered, making a total of fifty-three in our hands now, including Hog, Crow, and Left Hand, three headmen. It is reported to me that Dull Knife is dead, but I am not sure. We will have many more before dark, as the traveling is good and five companies are out.

"WESSELLS,
Captain Third Cavalry, Commanding."

GEO. CROOK,
Briquadier-General.

[Telegram.]

FORT ROBINSON, NEBR.,
January 11, 1879.

To COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.:

The Cheyennes commenced their attempt to escape on the night of January 9 by firing upon the guard, killing one soldier and wounding four others, and continued

ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON. 45

firing during their flight, showing they must have had secreted arms and ammunition in the building. So far there are three soldiers killed and seven wounded. About fifty of those who attempted to escape recaptured; a number killed. Troops out today after remainder.

JOHNSON,
Acting Agent.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 15, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit for your information copy of telegram from Lieutenant-General Sheridan, 13th instant, in regard to the Cheyenne prisoners who broke away from Camp Robinson, Nebr.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[Telegram received at War Department, Washington, D. C., January 13, 1879, from Chicago, Ill., January 13, 1879.]

To General E. D. TOWNSEND,

Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington, D. C.:

General Crook has obtained as yet but meager news of the disturbances at Fort Robinson, but has taken steps to have a full and exact report. It would appear from a telegram yesterday from Captain Wessells, who is in pursuit, that the Indians are well supplied with arms and ammunition, which leads to the supposition that arms and ammunition were secreted in the cañon where they first made a stand. They left the place on the night of the 10th, but were again overtaken yesterday and surrendered, not however without some loss to the troops. They doubtless will all be captured, and with the highest regard for humanity in doing so. The official reports make the number of Indians killed so far thirty.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 22, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a copy of a telegram from General George Crook, dated the 14th instant, communicating a report of the same date from Captain Wessells, commanding Fort Robinson, Nebr., of operations against the Cheyennes who broke away from that post.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, NEBR., *January 14, 1879.*

General P. H. SHERIDAN, *Chicago:*

The following telegram just received:

“FORT ROBINSON, NEBR., 14th.

“ADJUTANT-GENERAL,
“*Department Platte, Fort Omaha:*

“Just returned. Yesterday we fired forty rounds of shells, spherical case, and solid shot into the rifle-pits of Indians; and, although they burst right around them, none were injured. In the night they got away. This was twenty miles from here, on the Hat Creek road. My command is utterly worn-out; but I will try them again with companies E and H. I can't say too much in praise of the zeal of the officers and soldiers of this command.

“WESSELLS,
“*Captain Third Cavalry, Commanding.*”

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

Official.

WM. D. WHIPPLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

[First indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 16, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General Commanding.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 22, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of telegram from General Crook, dated the 16th instant, communicating report of Lieut. W. S. Schuyler, aid-de-camp, that the squaws at Fort Robinson refuse to talk; but he has ascertained that all the young Cheyenne prisoners were actively engaged in the Kansas outrages, and that the fugitives who escape the troops will probably join Little Wolf in the vicinity of the Powder River.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[Telegram.]

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN,
Chicago, Ill.:

OMAHA, NEBR., January 16, 1879.

The following just received:

"FORT ROBINSON, NEBR., 16th.

"To General CROOK,
"Omaha, Nebraska:

"The squaws refuse to talk; but I have interviewed Hog, Crow, and Left Hand. They say that all the young men, including those of their party, were actively engaged in the Kansas outrages, though the old men tried to restrain them; probably at least fifteen of those lately in prison here were engaged in those massacres. Hog and Crow repeat emphatically what I stated in my report, 'that the Cheyennes would never have been gotten out of their prison alive after they knew that they had to go south.' The cutting down their rations only made them more desperate, because it proved that the government would not change its determination; they feared to be sent to Florida, or otherwise severely dealt with; they say that the arms must have been taken apart and concealed in their clothing when first confined, though they refuse to give much information on this point; they also say that, if any of the fugitives escape the troops, it is uncertain where they will go, but probably to join Little Wolf, whom they believe to be in the vicinity of the Powder.

"O'Beirne is here, and everything seems to be calm at Red Cloud.

"W. S. SCHUYLER, A. D. C."

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier-General.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 17, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General Commanding.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 22, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit for your information a copy of a telegram dated January 16, from General Crook, reporting additional information regarding the Cheyennes who broke away from Fort Robinson.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. the SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[Telegram.]

OMAHA, January 16, 1879.

Lieut. Gen. P. H. SHERIDAN, *Chicago*:

The following just received:

"FORT ROBINSON, NEBR., 16th.

"General CROOK, *Omaha*:

"Of the escaped Cheyennes there are fully forty-five not yet accounted for by death or capture. Of these, nineteen are bucks. When last heard from on the evening of 13th, they were about twenty-two miles distant, going northwest. Many of them must be wounded; they traveled very slowly, and when their last intrenchment was examined, it was found that at least six shells from the cannon had burst amongst them. As they are quite readily trailed in the snow, it is probable that the troops will overtake nearly all of them. Wessells started with company at 4 this morning, leaving Vroom in command here. I shall get all the information I can about the depredations.

"W. S. SCHUYLER,
"Aid-de-Camp."

GEO. CROOK,
Brigadier General.

[First Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI,
Chicago, January 17, 1879.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant General Commanding.

Senator ALLISON. Have you any information as to the treatment of these Cheyennes at Camp Robinson after they were placed there under the surveillance of the military, and up to the time that they broke out?

Secretary SCHURZ. The Interior Department having absolutely nothing to do with them during that period, while they were under the control of the Army, I have no knowledge of the facts you refer to, except such as is derived from newspaper reports, and that knowledge is doubtless also in the possession of the committee.

Senator ALLISON. Will you express any opinion with reference to the treatment of the Cheyenne prisoners at Camp Robinson previous to the outbreak there?

Secretary SCHURZ. I repeat that the Interior Department had no control over them at all at that time. I may say that my own opinion coincides with that expressed by General Sheridan as to the policy of returning the prisoners to the Indian Territory when he says that "unless they are sent back the whole reservation system will receive a shock which will endanger its stability." It was, therefore, necessary that the Indians should be taken back to their reservation. As to other things which happened there, as is reported, I am of the opinion that in every respect it would have been better to treat the prisoners well than to treat them harshly. I think that freezing and starving them was not the way to reconcile them to their fate. If there were any turbulent and mischievous spirits among them, disposed to excite the rest to resistance, the way to avoid trouble would have been to separate the unruly persons from the rest, and to treat all as kindly as possible. The removal in two separate parties could thus have been accomplished without difficulty. A measure like this, it seems to me, would have suggested itself at once.

There has been some unfavorable criticism in the newspapers on the delay in their removal. In reference to this, I desire to say that about the middle of November, long before the outbreak at Camp Robinson took place, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs recommended the removal of the prisoners to Fort Wallace in Kansas, and that recommendation, with my approval, was forwarded shortly afterward to the War

Department for the action of the military authorities, who had control of the captives. What the reasons were that caused the delay in the action of the military I do not know.

December 27, 1878, the Indian Office received information from the War Department that a number of the captive Cheyennes were destitute of clothing. Inquiry was made how many of them needed clothing, and orders were given that the clothing should be bought. This clothing could not be furnished at once, for the reason that after the annuity goods are delivered we cannot, on account of our appropriations, keep any stock of clothing on hand upon which to draw in emergencies. If the military authorities at Camp Robinson had applied for such clothing before, it would have been furnished sooner; but if there was any suffering on account of the want of it, it would undoubtedly have been practicable for them to furnish the Indians some spare Army blankets to provide for the immediate necessity. As the captive Cheyennes were under the exclusive control of the military, we had no information about their needs, unless it came through the military authorities themselves.

Senator OGLESBY. Are you satisfied from correspondence and information from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Indian agent at the Cheyenne and Arrapahoe Agency, where these Northern Cheyennes were located in the Indian Territory, that the supplies and rations they were entitled to under the treaty of 1868 were delivered to them?

Secretary SCHURZ. That is my opinion, based upon the detailed reports about that matter from Agent Miles, and the investigation made by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The official reports bearing upon upon that point are among the papers I have submitted.

There was a report in the newspapers some time ago that the military desired to apply to Red Cloud for a number of Indian scouts to be taken from his band, to co-operate with the troops in capturing the hostile Cheyennes. This information disquieted us somewhat, for it was thought that if the Sioux were in any way drawn into this fight, the consequences might become troublesome. So it was suggested to the Secretary of War that if the scouts were employed, it should be to secure, if possible in a peaceable way, the surrender of the Cheyennes, and not to fight them. The Secretary of War acted upon this suggestion, and communicated to me as the result this dispatch from General Sheridan:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, January 22, 1879.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit copy of instructions telegraphed General Sheridan on the 19th instant, at the suggestion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that Red Cloud scouts should only be employed to secure the surrender of escaped Cheyennes and not to fight them; also copy of General Sheridan's reply, that General Crook had been so notified.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. MCCRARY,
Secretary of War.

The Hon. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

[Telegrams.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington D. C., January 19, 1879.

General P. H. SHERIDAN,
Commanding Division, Chicago, Ill.:

The Secretary of War, at the instance of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, wishes the commanding officer at Camp Robinson to be instructed, in case he uses any of Red Cloud scouts, to do so more with the object of securing the surrender of the escaped

ESCAPE OF CHEYENNE INDIANS FROM FORT ROBINSON. 49

Cheyennes than for the purpose of fighting them. Please convey this instruction as quickly as possible.

W. T. SHERMAN,
General.

CHICAGO, ILL., *January 19, 1879.*

General Wm. T. SHERMAN,
Washington, D. C.:

Your telegram of this date received and General Crook duly notified. I have no official information of any intention to use Red Cloud scouts for any purpose. I feel somewhat disgusted at the manner in which the whole Cheyenne business has been conducted at Fort Robinson.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Lieutenant-General.

S. Ex. 64—4